The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) is the primary legislation that regulates cartels in Korea. The Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, together with guidelines published by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”), detail or supplement the MRFTA provisions. The KFTC guidelines include:

• Guidelines for Filing Applications for the Approval of Cartels and Competition-Restrictive Practices;
• Guidelines for Cartel Review;
• Guidelines on Examination of Cartels in Bidding;
• KFTC Notice on the Operations of the Leniency Guidelines for Voluntary Disclosure of Unfair Collusive Acts;
• Guidelines for Examination of Cartels Involving Administrative Guidance; and
• Guidelines for Review of Cartels Involving Information Exchange between Business Entities.

There are also guidelines issued by the Prosecutors’ Office (“PO”) on 10 December 2020, “Guidelines for the Reduction of Penalty in Cartel Cases and Investigation Procedures”, through which a criminal leniency programme (in addition to a leniency programme available under the MRFTA) was formally implemented for cartel cases.

Even if a conduct falls under any of the anti-competitive arrangements outlined in the MRFTA, exemptions may be granted if the conduct serves specific purposes and approval is obtained from the KFTC through prior application filing. These purposes include:

• Industrial restructuring for recovery from economic recession;
• Research and technical development;
• Rationalization of transaction terms; and
• Improvement of competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)

Apart from the MRFTA, both the Criminal Act and the Framework Act on the Construction Industry also regulate cartel. Article 315 of the Criminal Act prohibits any tampering with the fairness of auctions or tenders through fraudulent, coercive, or other deceptive methods. Similarly, Article 95 of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry penalizes individuals who collude with other bidders to submit prearranged bid prices, thereby unjustly benefiting or disrupting fair pricing mechanisms. These provisions encompass bid-rigging as a form of cartel behavior, warranting legal consequences. Consequently, in bid-rigging instances, a single act of cartel behavior may constitute multiple offenses under the MRFTA, the Criminal Act, and the Framework Act on the Construction Industry.

Yes, to establish an infringement under the MRFTA, it is necessary to demonstrate that the concerted behaviour among competitors unreasonably restrains significantly impedes competition within the relevant market. This requirement applies to both hard-core and soft-core cartels; however, according to the KFTC’s standards for reviewing anti competitiveness, detailed review varies depending on whether conduct is hard-core cartel or soft-core cartel.  In instances of hard-core cartels, the burden of proof is eased and the KFTC may perform a basic evaluation of the market, including its structure and the competitive dynamics affected by the conduct, to presume its illegality without a detailed assessment of its competitive impact. Conversely, for soft-core cartels, with both anti-competitive and efficiency-enhancing effects might be present, a thorough examination of these effects is mandated to ascertain the conduct’s legality.

Additionally, the Guidelines for Cartel Review indicates that if the cartel’s market share does not exceed 20%, it is generally presumed that their conduct has negligible or no anti-competitive effects and the KFTC will conclude its review (“safe habour”).

The MRFTA applies to conduct occurring outside Korea if it impacts the Korean market. Specifically, Article 3 of the MRFTA states that it covers extraterritorial conduct linked to the Korean market. The Korean Supreme Court (“SCK”) has ruled that only conducts with a direct, significant, and foreseeable effect on the Korean market fall under the MRFTA’s jurisdiction. It also highlighted the principle of comity in competition law, cautioning against overly broad extraterritorial enforcement of the MRFTA to avoid unfair outcomes. Similarly, the KFTC upholds the principle of comity in its application of competition law.

The KFTC is the government agency that enforces the MRFTA. A final decision of the KFTC on whether there was a violation of the MRFTA – based on evidence and testimonies gathered during its investigation and deliberations – may be appealed at the Seoul High Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction. A party that seeks to object to the Seoul High Court’s decision may file an appeal to the Supreme Court.

As for criminal prosecution, generally, the PO is given prosecution authority for cartel matters only when the KFTC refers the matter to the PO because the KFTC has the exclusive right to make criminal referrals in relation to MRFTA violations . Meanwhile, cartel matters not referred to the PO by the KFTC may still be reinvestigated and referred for criminal prosecution at the request of certain other government agencies. The prosecutor general may request that the KFTC file a criminal referral with the PO if the conduct constitutes a serious violation of the MRFTA. For certain bid-rigging conduct that violates the Criminal Act or the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, the KFTC’s referral is not necessary for the PO to prosecute the case. The Chairperson of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, the Minister of SMEs and Startups, and the Administrator of the Public Procurement Service may also request that the KFTC file a criminal referral for other reasons, such as far-reaching social effects, influence on the national finance, and the extent of the damage to small and medium enterprises. Upon receipt of a request for filing a criminal referral from the above-mentioned government authorities, the KFTC shall file a criminal referral with the Prosecutor General (“KFTC’s obligatory criminal referral”). In conclusion, even if a company may exempt from the KFTC’s criminal referral, the company should take notice that it can also be subject to criminal procedure if other government agencies request the KFTC to file a criminal referral.

The KFTC initiates cartel investigations when a leniency application is filed or when it becomes aware of potential cartel activities through public sources, complaints, or other governmental information. Following this, the KFTC may conduct on-site investigations, seize documents, and interview employees.

Key steps in the process include:

• On-site Investigations and Evidence Collection: The KFTC collects evidence through raids, document seizures, and interviews.
• Examiner’s Report: After reviewing the evidence, the KFTC issues an examiner’s report outlining the allegations and supporting evidence. Respondents have three to four weeks to submit a written response, with possible extensions for complex cases or overseas parent companies.
• Hearing (Deliberation): A hearing can be scheduled after several months from receiving the written response. KFTC commissioners then make a final decision.
• Decision: The final decision is documented in writing, typically issued within weeks to months after the hearing.

The KFTC possesses extensive powers to enforce the MRFTA, reliant on the cooperation of those under investigation. These powers are outlined below. Meanwhile, any refusal, obstruction or evasion of an investigation through verbal abuse or assault, or intentional obstruction or delaying the KFTC’s entry to the site can lead to imprisonment of up to three years or criminal fines of up to KRW 200 million. And any refusal, obstruction or evasion of an investigation through concealment, destruction, denial of access, or forgery or alteration of data during the investigation can lead to imprisonment of up to two years or criminal fines of up to KRW 150 million.

• RFI (Information Requests): The KFTC can demand the submission of documents or items necessary for investigation from businesses, executives, or employees. This includes both suspected and third parties, such as competitors and customers.
• Dawn Raids: The KFTC has the authority to inspect business premises for documents, electronic data, and other materials without prior notice, with the company’s consent. While these dawn raids do not require a court warrant, the KFTC has recently clarified the details and limits of its investigative rights through various efforts, such as by specifying alleged violations in its notice of investigation, establishing investigation standards for its compliance support department, and when extending its dawn raid period, stating reasons such extensions in its notice of extensions
• Interviews: The KFTC has the right to summon and hear from accused parties, witnesses, or other interested parties. Failure to comply without just cause can result in administrative surcharge of up to KRW 100 million for entities or KRW 10 million for individuals.
• Expert Witnesses: It may appoint expert witnesses to provide insights during investigations.

For the PO, its powers align with general criminal procedures, including arrests and search and seizure, contingent on obtaining court-issued warrants.

Korean law does not recognise the principle of attorney-client privilege. Therefore, the investigated company cannot refuse to provide materials requested by the KFTC solely on the basis that they are privileged information. Separately, if the materials requested by the KFTC contain information protected by the Personal Information Protection Act, such as employees’ registration numbers and addresses, the investigated company may submit the materials after redacting the parts containing such personal information. Furthermore, if the materials requested by the KFTC contain confidential information or trade secret, redactions of such information or non-disclosure vis-à-vis third parties can be requested.

The MRFTA’s leniency programme grants full immunity from administrative surcharges and remedial orders to the first applicant who provides crucial evidence of a cartel, with discretion for immunity to criminal charges also typically extended. To qualify for first-priority leniency, the applicant must:

• be the first person to exclusively provide evidence necessary to prove the existence of a cartel;
• voluntarily submit the evidence before the KFTC comes into possession of any or enough information to substantiate the existence of a cartel;
• cooperate fully with the KFTC’s investigation by sharing all relevant facts and documents;
• cease cartel participation immediately upon applying for leniency; and
• not have coerced others into the cartel or been a repeat participant in cartels.

Disclosure of leniency applications to third parties without KFTC’s consent or providing false information during the investigation may result in revocation of leniency status. Also, if a leniency applicant later provides a statement in court that is different from that provided to the KFTC during the investigation process, reduction or exemption from remedial orders or administrative surcharges that the leniency applicant has received may be cancelled.

Leniency applications must generally be in writing and can be done so through an in-person visit to the KFTC, email, or fax. While oral submissions may sometimes be permitted, they cannot be made over the phone.

The PO offers a leniency programme known as the Criminal Leniency Programme, introduced on 10 December 2020. This programme largely mirrors the KFTC Leniency Programme but is tailored to target hardcore cartels under the MRFTA (e.g., price fixing, output restrictions, market allocation), and certain bid-rigging behaviors. The Criminal Leniency Programme is open to individuals and businesses. The first-priority applicant under the Criminal Leniency Programme is eligible for exemption from indictment. And applicants, in general, are protected from search and seizure, arrest, detention, and other investigations, except in exceptional circumstances.

The second applicant for leniency may qualify for a 50% reduction in the administrative surcharge and potential exemptions from remedial orders and criminal referral to the PO. To attain second-priority leniency status, the applicant must fulfill the same conditions outlined for first-leniency status, with the exception of being the second to provide evidence. If the cartel involves only two participants, second-priority leniency status is not available. To qualify, the applicant must cooperate fully, cease participation in the cartel, refrain from coercion or illegal conduct, and be the second to exclusively provide evidence within two years of the first applicant’s filing. Meanwhile, the second-priority applicant under the Criminal Leniency Programme is eligible for a lighter sentencing.

Markers (ie, simplified applications) are available. An applicant that submits its identity and a brief overview of the cartel will be deemed to have filed its application on that date. The applicant is initially provided a 15-day period to supplement its application and an extra 60 days may be provided if a valid reason for extension is presented. An extension of more than 60 days may be granted if the KFTC finds that additional time would be needed to collect relevant evidence and obtain statements (eg, international cartel cases). A full application is expected to be submitted by the end of the period for supplementation.

However, there are certain limits regarding supplementation, both in terms of timing and content. For instance, if the leniency application needs to include a new entity, like an affiliate of the original applicant, this addition must be made within a 75-day window.

Similarly, the Criminal Leniency Programme offers markers. However, for marker supplementation, a 30-day period is provided instead of 15, extendable if deemed necessary by the PO, especially in cases involving international cartels.

The KFTC’s Leniency Programme requires applicants to cooperate continuously until the investigation concludes for priority status. The KFTC assesses cooperation based on:

• whether the applicant provided related information to the best of their knowledge without delay;
• whether all related materials in possession of the applicant or that the applicant could obtain were submitted promptly;
• whether the applicant promptly responded to the KFTC’s requests for information and cooperated with its requests;
• whether the applicant used its best efforts to have its employees cooperate with the KFTC’s investigation in good faith; and
• whether there was any evidence that was destroyed, damaged, forged or concealed by the applicant.

A leniency applicant that discloses the fact that it applied for leniency to third parties, including participants of the cartel, before the conclusion of the KFTC’s deliberation and without the KFTC’s approval, will be deemed to have failed to meet the good-faith cooperation requirement. Also, a leniency applicant that later provides a statement in court that is different from that provided to the KFTC during the investigation process, or provides false information, will have its leniency status revoked.

The standards under the Criminal Leniency Programme are largely identical.

The KFTC’s leniency programme is limited to “business entities”, with no provision for current or former employees and directors to apply for leniency. However, when a business entity applies for leniency and meets the requirements, in practice, the KFTC does not refer its current or former employees and directors to the PO for criminal prosecution. Yet, it is worth noting that violation of bid-rigging under the Criminal Act or the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, may still result in prosecution, regardless of leniency granted by the KFTC.

In contrast, the PO’s leniency programme is open to both “business entities” and “individuals”. When a business entity applies for leniency, it must list current executive officers and employees who seek immunity from prosecution. If former employees and directors wish to benefit from immunity, they must apply separately. Notably, first-priority leniency granted by the PO covers violations of the Criminal Act, the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, or the MRFTA, providing comprehensive immunity from prosecution for eligible individuals.

The KFTC has an amnesty plus programme. If a company is involved in the first cartel and applies for leniency as the first applicant for the second cartel, and if this company submits a leniency application for the second cartel after the KFTC begins investigating the first cartel but before the KFTC holds a hearing for it, the company may qualify for further leniency regarding the cartel for which it wasn’t the initial leniency applicant. The size of both cartels is considered in determining the degree of additional leniency. Here, ‘size’ refers to the total turnover of all participants involved in the cartels. If the second cartel is smaller than, or of the same size as, the first cartel, a reduction of surcharge by up to 20 percent may be granted. If the size of the second cartel is at least four times greater than that of the first cartel, the entire amount of the surcharge is waived.

There is no plea bargaining or settlement system for a cartel case in Korea. In addition, consent decrees do not apply to cartel cases.

N/A (There are no settlement procedures regarding cartel cases)

(1) Inter-agency cooperation

When deemed necessary for enforcement of the MRFTA, the KFTC may ask the head of the relevant administrative agency or other institution or organization to conduct the necessary investigation or to share necessary information. In fact, with regard to bid-rigging cartel monitoring, the KFTC is strengthening cooperation with major organizations by holding meetings with quasi-governmental organizations, public institutions, local public enterprises and related organizations that provide bid-related information to the KFTC’s BRIAS (Bid Rigging Indicator Analysis System).

(2) Co-operation with foreign enforcement agencies

The KFTC actively collaborates with foreign enforcement agencies to investigate international cartels. This cooperation involves various channels and agreements with jurisdictions such as the EU, Brazil, Russia, China, Japan, and the US. Additionally, Korea is also an active member of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development’s Competition Committee and the International Competition Network (ICN), and has attended the East Asia Top-level Officials’ Meeting on Competition Policy every year since 2008.

Investigations of international cartels by the competition authorities of the EU and the US will likely lead to an investigation in Korea. The KFTC keeps a close watch on foreign competition authorities and how cases are penalized overseas. In some cases, the KFTC shares information on suspected violations and investigation progress with the DG Comp of the EU, US FTC or the US DOJ. It may also conduct dawn raids simultaneously with other competition authorities worldwide, if required. However, even during such cross-border collaborations, competition authorities typically do not directly exchange evidence acquired from the subjects of the investigation.

(1) Criminal sanctions

The MRFTA provides that a person who engaged in cartel activity may be subject to a term of imprisonment of up to three years or a penalty of up to KRW 200 million, or both. Companies that engaged in cartel activity may be subject to a penalty of up to KRW 200 million. If the company is a corporation, criminal penalties may also be imposed on the representatives of such corporation as well as the individuals concerned.

A person who engages in bid-rigging prohibited under the Criminal Act may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to two years or a penalty of up to KRW 7 million. A person who engages in bid-rigging prohibited under the Framework Act on the Construction Industry may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to five years, or by a penalty of up to KRW 200 million. The sentences imposed by the court vary depending on the details of the case. While courts tended to impose criminal punishment only on corporations that participated in illegal cartels in the past, recently there has been an increase in the number of cases where the employees or executives directly involved in the cartel were subject to criminal punishment.

(2) Administrative sanctions

Companies that participated in cartel activity may be subject to sanctions such as remedial orders and administrative surcharges. In most cases, the KFTC imposes both a remedial order and a surcharge. Administrative surcharges may be up to 20 percent of the relevant revenue and, if no revenue has been generated, a surcharge not exceeding KRW 4 billion. However, for conduct that ended before 30 December 2021 (for which the pre-amendment version of the MRFTA would apply), a surcharge not exceeding 10 percent of the relevant revenue and, if no revenue has been generated, a surcharge not exceeding KRW 2 billion may be imposed.

When setting an administrative surcharge, the KFTC considers various factors including the details and severity of the violation, the duration and frequency of the violation, the profits gained from it, whether collusion was carried out, cooperation with investigations, voluntary correction of the issue, the defendant’s ability to pay, market and economic conditions, and the impact of the violation on the market.

(1) International cartel case

In September 2018, nine Japanese capacitor manufacturers and sellers faced administrative surcharges totaling KRW 36 billion (approximately USD 26.6 million) from the KFTC as well as criminal referrals for colluding to hike and sustain product prices over a 14-year period from 2000. The KFTC uncovered the collective price inflation of aluminum and tantalum capacitors supplied globally, including to Korea, from July 2000 to January 2014. These companies strategized at CEO and manager levels to avoid international price competition, sharing detailed information and tactics to execute planned price hikes and uphold minimum prices among companies serving the same customers. The KFTC found that this collusion negatively impacted the supply prices of capacitors exported to Korea, totaling approximately KRW 736.6 billion (approximately USD 545.2 million) during the collusion period.

(2) Domestic cartel case

In February 2022, major ice-cream manufacturers faced administrative surcharges from the KFTC, totaling around KRW 135 billion (approximately USD 99.9 million), for collusion-related practices. The manufacturers had agreed in February 2016 not to supply ice cream to retail stores that had business ties with competitors, aiming to combat price competition in supplying ice cream to small and medium-sized retail outlets. This agreement led to reduced competition in the market as retail stores typically sourced from a single manufacturer. Additionally, the manufacturers colluded on factors influencing delivery prices to convenience stores, hypermarkets, and others, and rigged bids for ice-cream supply contracts. The KFTC concluded that these collusive behaviors over approximately four years significantly impacted the entire domestic ice cream market.

No, there is no system in place that automatically holds parent companies accountable for administrative, civil, or criminal charges stemming from their subsidiaries’ cartel activities.

A person who suffers damage from illegal cartel conduct may file a lawsuit to claim damages against those who engaged in such practice.

The Korean legal system does not allow class actions in antitrust litigation. However, victims can jointly file a private lawsuit for antitrust damages. The outcome of the damages lawsuit will only be legally binding on the plaintiffs, although courts will take into account the outcome of a previous lawsuit based on the same facts in subsequent damages lawsuits filed by other victims of the same conduct.

Previously, the compensation for damages was limited to the actual damages suffered by the claimant. However, a punitive damage provision was newly introduced through the recent amendment to the MRFTA, which allows treble damages for damages caused by cartel conduct committed on or after March 19, 2019. Accordingly, a cartel participant may be held liable for damages not exceeding three times the actual damages to the injured party.

In determining damages resulting from cartel behavior, the court evaluates it as the disparity between the price set by the cartel and the price that would have been established in the absence of such collusion, known as the “hypothetical competitive price.” This hypothetical price is calculated by excluding only the price increase attributed to the cartel while keeping other market pricing factors intact. As this price is theoretical and doesn’t exist in reality, estimating it requires the use of the most objective and logical method, such as comparing prices before and after the cartel (the before and after method), comparing cartel prices with those in a standard market (the yardstick method), or employing other econometric methods. Factors such as the type of cartel behavior, market conditions, and available data influence the choice of method. In practice, when lawsuits are filed for damages resulting from cartel activities, experts often utilize econometric analysis to calculate the damages.

If the alleged violator believes that the KFTC’s decision contains a factual or legal error, they have the option to object to the KFTC and/or file an administrative lawsuit with the Seoul High Court. To further appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the Seoul High Court’s judgment, the accused party must demonstrate and substantiate a legal error, which involves proving any violation of constitutional provisions, laws, orders, or regulations that influenced the Seoul High Court’s ruling.

(1) Administrative Sanctions

If the KFTC issues a remedial order or administrative surcharge due to cartel behavior, within 30 days of receiving the KFTC’s decision, the affected party can either (i) file an objection with the KFTC or (ii) initiate an administrative lawsuit with the Seoul High Court. The party has the discretion to choose between these two options but can only pursue one of them. After submitting an objection to the KFTC, if a decision is made, the affected party can file a lawsuit with the Seoul High Court and such a lawsuit must be filed within 30 days of the date the decision is rendered.

(2) Criminal Sanctions

If the PO files a criminal charge for the violation of the MRFTA, the proceedings follow the generally standard criminal procedures in Korea. The accused undergoes three stages of trials (district court, high court, and Supreme Court) after indictment by the PO. If the accused disagrees with the court’s ruling, they can appeal based on factual or legal errors.

(i) Global container shipping companies’ cartel

In 2022, the KFTC fined 22 global container shipping companies and related associations a total of KRW 96.43 billion (approximately USD 71.4 million) for colluding on freight rates via various communication channels.

The companies cited Article 29 of the Marine Transportation Act (“MTA”) as permitting exceptions for such agreements. However, the KFTC disagreed, deeming the agreement a violation of the MRFTA and an unlawful cartel. The companies appealed to the Seoul High Court.

In February 2024, the Seoul High Court ruled in favor of the companies, overturning the KFTC’s decision. The Seoul High Court stated that the MRFTA doesn’t apply when a law acknowledges exceptions to free competition and the conduct meets the necessary minimum conduct under that law. The court also affirmed the MTA’s provision of exclusive authority to regulate such conduct to the Minister of Oceans and Fisheries, excluding the KFTC. The KFTC appealed the decision, and the case is pending in the Supreme Court.

(ii) Foreign car manufacturers’ case

In 2023, the KFTC fined foreign car manufacturers approximately KRW 30 billion (approximately USD 22.2 million) finding that the OEMs colluded to introduce SCR software aiming to reduce AdBlue dosing amount, which resulted in increased NOx emissions. This is the first case where the KFTC penalized R&D agreements, deeming them anti-competitive for limiting product types and standards in innovative environment-related technology development.

(i) The PO’s proactive investigation into anticompetitive practices

In the past, the PO rarely directly indicted top executives for alleged violations of the MRFTA. However, this trend has shifted recently. Between July 2022 and July 2023, the Seoul Central District PO indicted 76 individuals and 34 corporate entities in 21 criminal antitrust cases, showcasing this change.

Specifically, the PO has become more proactive in requesting referrals from the KFTC for criminal prosecution. Under the MRFTA, the KFTC must refer cases to the PO for criminal prosecution. In cases where the KFTC hasn’t initiated a referral, the PO may request it, and the KFTC is obliged to comply. This occurred in five cartel cases among the 21 mentioned earlier.

Similarly, the PO has started launching its own investigations without waiting for referrals from the KFTC. In April 2023, it investigated major domestic furniture companies for alleged bid-rigging, marking the first instance of the PO initiating an investigation through its Criminal Leniency Programme without the KFTC’s referral. Again, in August 2023, the PO independently investigated bid-rigging allegations against construction offices through its Criminal Leniency Programme.

(ii) Increasing emphasis on directors’ internal control

Recently, the SCK has recognized the internal control obligations of CEOs, directors, and even outside directors not directly involved in business operations. The court has expressed its commitment to examining violations of these obligations and defining criteria regarding internal control obligations.

In November 2021, the SCK ruled that a CEO who fails to make an adequate effort to establish an internal control system despite a substantial risk of collusion would be in breach of their duty.

In May 2022, the SCK, for the first time, held outside directors accountable for neglecting internal control obligations and failing to prevent collusion. The court provided criteria for assessing breaches of these duties: (i) directors must identify relevant laws, ensure compliance, and establish operational internal control systems to promptly address violations in tasks with significant legal risks. (ii) failure of outside directors to establish or address deficiencies in the internal control system may constitute a breach of their monitoring duty.

Moreover, the SCK clarified that merely establishing a system or assigning responsible personnel doesn’t guarantee an effective internal control system. The court emphasized assessing system functionality and the proper execution of duties by responsible individuals.

In January 2024, reports emerged that the KFTC had issued an examiner’s report to major banks in Korea regarding their involvement in an information exchange cartel. This report, akin to a prosecutor’s indictment, does not yet indicate any definitive findings of unlawful cartel by the KFTC. Allegations in the report suggest that major banks exchanged information concerning loan-to-value ratios for mortgage loans.

The MRFTA was amended in 2021 to include information exchange as a form of cartel. Previously, such exchanges were not recognized as a distinct form of cartel in Korea. The case against major banks marks the first application of this newly introduced provision. It is anticipated that through this case, the KFTC will outline its stance on interpreting and implementing the requirements, scope, and competitive implications of information exchange cartel under the MRFTA for the first time.

Lastly, from June 2024, a new MRFTA is scheduled to be implemented whereby the legal basis for the antitrust compliance program is established and the KFTC can reduce the scope of remedial order or administrative surcharge or grant awards according to the result of the KFTC’s evaluation. Once the new MRFTA goes into effect, it is expected that interest in compliance programmes will increase in relation to the responsibility of the directors’ internal control noted above. It is worth noting that the need for establishing or reviewing a compliance programme to prevent cartels has increased as a proactive action to prevent risks rather than regulating cartels ex post facto.