Egypt signed the International Centre for Settlement of Investor Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention on 11 February 1972, it was ratified on 3 May 1972, and it entered into force for Egypt on 2 June 1972.¹

As of the latest available records, Egypt has not made any specific notifications or designations under Articles 25(1) or 25(4) of the ICSID Convention.² This implies that Egypt’s adherence to ICSID is governed primarily by its network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), which outline the specific terms and conditions under which ICSID arbitration is available to foreign investors.

Footnote(s):

¹ ICSID Database: “List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention”
available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ICSID-3.pdf

² ICSID, “Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention (ICSID/8)” (28 October 2022), available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022_Oct%2028_ICSID.ENG.pdf

Egypt’s accession to the New York Convention was on 9 March 1959, and the Convention entered into force on 7 June 1959 with no reservations or declarations.³

Footnote(s):

³ Contracting States. New York Arbitration Convention. https://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states

Egypt adopted a Model BIT in 2022, which incorporates standard provisions without any notable restrictions or omissions in relation to investors’ rights.⁴ The Model BIT does not include provisions on corporate conduct, corporate social responsibility, environmental protection, or other similar provisions.

That said, Article 5 permits nationalization or expropriation of an investment, provided it serves the public’s interest. However, Article 5 stipulates that any such act shall be accompanied by adequate compensation to the investor.⁵

The Model BIT includes references to the most favored nation principle, fair and equitable treatment, and the rules governing expropriation. Moreover, the Model BIT outlines several dispute resolution mechanisms, including; the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Ad-hoc arbitration, arbitration through the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration in Cairo (“CRCICA”), and litigation through domestic courts.

All these provisions provide the necessary framework for investment protection, and they ensure that the investors rights are sufficiently protected.

Footnote(s):

⁴ Model Agreements. Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/model-agreements.

⁵ Egypt Model BIT (2022)

BITs are agreements which establish the framework governing investments made by individuals and companies from one state in the territory of another state.⁶ Egypt has signed a total of 116 BITs, 72 of them are in force, 29 were signed but did not enter into force, and 15 were terminated.⁷

The following is a list of all the BITs currently in force:

1. Egypt – France BIT (1974)
2. Egypt – United Kingdom BIT (1975)
3. Egypt – Japan BIT (1977)
4. Egypt – Sweden BIT (1978)
5. Egypt – Somalia BIT (1982)
6. Egypt – Tunisia BIT (1989)
7. Egypt – Libya BIT (1990)
8. Egypt – United States of America BIT (1986)
9. Egypt – Ukraine BIT (1992)
10. Egypt – Argentina – BIT (1992)
11. Egypt – Uzbekistan BIT (1992)
12. Egypt – Albania BIT (1993)
13. Egypt – Spain BIT (1992)
14. Egypt – Italy BIT (1989)
15. Egypt – Czech Republic BIT (1993)
16. Egypt – Greece BIT (1993)
17. Egypt – Turkmenistan BIT (1995)
18. Egypt – China BIT (1994)
19. Egypt – Kazakhstan BIT (1993)
20. Egypt – Lebanon BIT (1996)
21. Egypt – Romania BIT (1994)
22. Egypt – Korea, Republic of BIT (1996)
23. Egypt – Hungary BIT (1995)
24. Egypt – Canada BIT (1996)
25. Egypt – Poland BIT (1995)
26. Egypt – Netherlands BIT (1996)
27. Egypt – Sri Lanka BIT (1996)
28. Egypt – Yemen BIT (1996)
29. Egypt – Jordan BIT (1996)
30. Egypt – Latvia BIT (1997)
31. Egypt – Morocco BIT (1997)
32. Egypt – Syrian Arab Republic BIT (1997)
33. Egypt – United Arab Emirates BIT (1997)
34. Egypt – Bahrain BIT (1997)
35. Egypt – Belarus BIT (1997)
36. Egypt – Croatia BIT (1997)
37. Egypt – Cyprus BIT (1998)
38. Egypt – State of Palestine BIT (1998)
39. Egypt – Malawi BIT (1997)
40. Egypt – Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. of BIT (1997)
41. Egypt – Slovakia BIT (1997)
42. Egypt – Denmark BIT (1999)
43. Egypt – Slovenia BIT (1998)
44. Egypt – Comoros BIT (1994)
45. Egypt – Algeria BIT (1997)
46. Egypt – Oman BIT (1998)
47. Egypt – Bulgaria BIT (1998)
48. Egypt – Russian Federation BIT (1997)
49. Egypt – Mali BIT (1998)
50. Egypt – Malaysia BIT (1997)
51. Egypt – Malta BIT (1999)
52. Egypt – Portugal BIT (1999)
53. Egypt – Bosnia and Herzegovina BIT (1998)
54. Egypt – Viet Nam BIT (1997)
55. Egypt – Thailand BIT (2000)
56. Egypt – Singapore BIT (1997)
57. Egypt – Kuwait BIT (2001)
58. Egypt – Austria BIT (2001)
59. Egypt – BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union) BIT (1999)
60. Egypt – Turkey BIT (1996)
61. Egypt – Australia BIT (2001)
62. Egypt – Sudan BIT (2001)
63. Egypt – Mongolia BIT (2004)
64. Egypt – Finland BIT (2004)
65. Egypt – Armenia BIT (1996)
66. Egypt – Serbia BIT (2005)
67. Egypt – Qatar BIT (1999)
68. Egypt – Iceland BIT (2008)
69. Egypt – Germany BIT (2005)
70. Egypt – Ethiopia BIT (2006)
71. Egypt – Switzerland BIT (2010)
72. Egypt – Mauritius BIT (2014)

As for the 29 BITs that were signed but did not enter into force, below is a list of the said BITs:

1. Egypt – Saudi Arabia BIT (2024)
2. Egypt – Burundi BIT (2012)
3. Egypt – Botswana BIT (2003)
4. Egypt – Azerbaijan BIT (2002)
5. Egypt – Seychelles BIT (2002)
6. Egypt – Cameroon – Egypt BIT (2000)
7. Egypt – Eswatini BIT (2000)
8. Egypt – Nigeria BIT (2000)
9. Egypt – Zambia BIT (2000)
10. Egypt – Pakistan BIT (2000)
11. Egypt – Central African Republic BIT (2000)
12. Egypt – Macedonia, The former Yugoslav Republic of BIT (1999)
13. Egypt – Georgia BIT (1999)
14. Egypt – Chile BIT (1999)
15. Egypt – Zimbabwe BIT (1999)
16. Egypt – Jamaica BIT (1999)
17. Egypt – Democratic Republic of the Congo BIT (1998)
18. Egypt – Mozambique BIT (1998)
19. Egypt – South Africa BIT (1998)
20. Egypt – Djibouti BIT (1998)
21. Egypt – Chad BIT (1998)
22. Egypt – Ghana BIT (1998)
23. Egypt – Guinea BIT (1998)
24. Egypt – Senegal BIT (1998)
25. Egypt – Niger BIT (1998)
26. Egypt – Gabon BIT (1997)
27. Egypt – United Republic of Tanzania BIT (1997)
28. Egypt – Uganda BIT (1995)
29. Egypt – Iran, Islamic Republic of BIT (1977)

Additionally, Egypt has signed 21 different Investment Related Instruments (IRIs)⁸, with 19 multilateral treaties, 2 regional treaties, and 1 national agreement.⁹ The following is a list of IRIs currently in force:

1. TRIPS (Multilateral)
2. TRIMS (Multilateral)
3. Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment Credit (Regional/Plurilateral)
4. Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (Regional/Plurilateral)
5. MIGA Convention (Multilateral)
6. New York Convention (Multilateral)
7. ICSID Convention (Multilateral)
8. Fifth Protocol to GATS (Multilateral)
9. Fourth Protocol to GATS (Multilateral)
10. GATS (Multilateral)
11. UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (Multilateral)
12. Doha Declaration (Multilateral)
13. World Bank Investment Guidelines (Multilateral)
14. ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises (Multilateral)
15. ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises (Multilateral)
16. ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises (Multilateral)
17. Singapore Ministerial Declaration (Multilateral)
18. UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Multilateral)
19. Permanent Sovereignty UN Resolution (Multilateral)
20. New International Economic Order UN Resolution (Multilateral)
21. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Multilateral)

Egypt’s Model BIT was published in 2022 and only one BIT was signed following the publication of same. The Egypt – Saudi Arabia BIT was signed in 2024, but it has not been ratified yet.

Nonetheless, many of the BITs that were signed and ratified by Egypt pre-2022 already included similar language to that of the Model BIT. In some instances, the BITs included additional clauses that either broaden or restrict the investors’ rights. Below is a comparison between the Model BIT and those signed prior to 2022, highlighting the protections included in the signed agreements compared to those outlined in the Model BIT:

1. The direct and indirect expropriation clause mentioned in the Model BIT can also be found in all signed BITs. This clause has been invoked by investors in 78% of ICSID cases.¹⁰
2. The concept of fair and equitable treatment found in the Model BIT can also be found in 94 of the signed BITs. It has been invoked by investors in 71% of ICSID cases.¹¹
3. The most favored nation clause can be observed in the Model BIT and in 96 of the signed BITs. It has been invoked in 28% of ICSID cases.¹²
4. Protection and Security afforded to investments can be found in the Model BIT and in 88 of the signed BITs.
5. Arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism can be found in the Model BIT and in all signed BITs.
6. The Model BIT establishes a six-month cooling off period before arbitration proceedings can be initiated, a provision similarly reflected in 71 of the signed BITs. Other BITs may include a shorter or longer cooling off period, or they may indicate a cooling off period without mentioning its duration. On the other hand, there are six (6) BITs that do not mention a cooling off period.¹³

a. Has your state exercised termination rights or indicated any intention to do so? If so, on what basis (e.g. impact of the Achmea decisions, political opposition to the Energy Charter Treaty, or other changes in policy)?

Of the 15 terminated BITs mentioned above, 13 have been renegotiated and ratified while the remaining two (2) have been unilaterally terminated by the other contracting party (namely India¹⁴ and Indonesia¹⁵). It should be noted that the 13 that were renegotiated are included under the list of ratified BITs mentioned above.

Furthermore, Egypt is working towards attracting foreign investment and strengthening its investment regime. At the moment, there are no official statements regarding the State’s intention to terminate BITs.¹⁶

b. Do any of the treaties reflect (i) changes in environmental and energy policies, (ii) the advent of emergent technology, (iii) the regulation of investment procured by corruption, and (iv) transparency of investor state proceedings (whether due to the operation of the Mauritius Convention or otherwise).

Egypt’s BIT framework is primarily rooted in earlier models, with the first treaty to enter into force dating back to 1974. Consequently, these agreements contain limited references to contemporary issues such as environmental and energy policies, or emerging technologies. However, some BITs acknowledge health and environmental standards within their preambles, emphasizing the importance of achieving treaty objectives without undermining these standards. Examples include the BITs with Finland and Mauritius.

Another example is the Egypt-Canada BIT. Article 17 of the Egypt-Canada BIT explicitly affirms each contracting party’s right to implement measures ensuring that investment activities do not harm the environment. Furthermore, Article 16 establishes transparency obligations requiring both contracting parties to publish, or make publicly available, relevant regulations and decisions to ensure accessibility for stakeholders.

Seeing as the last ratified BIT entered into force before the development of the Mauritius Convention, no reference to the Convention can be found in Egypt’s ratified BITs. Once the Egypt–Saudi Arabia BIT is ratified, it will become clear whether the Mauritius Convention was incorporated/observed therein

c. Does your jurisdiction publish any official guidelines, notes verbales or diplomatic notes concerning the interpretation of treaty provisions and other issues arising under the treaties?

Egypt has no official publications regarding the interpretation of treaty provisions. Treaties can be found on East Laws’ website, and notes may sometimes be provided along with the published treaty.

Footnote(s):

⁶ Egypt. Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/62/egypt.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Beyond the traditional definition of IRIs, Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) can be considered investment-related instruments, considering their material impact on investment and their potential to either facilitate or hinder it. Egypt has entered into 57 DTAs, with only two—those with Oman and Qatar—remaining signed but not yet in force. Additionally, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), of which Egypt is a member, is another notable mention as it plays a role in promoting trade and investment in the region.

⁹ Egypt. Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment- agreements/countries/62/egypt.

¹⁰ After 48 Years at ICSID (1972–2020): An Overview. Kluwer Arbitration Blog. https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/03/15/after-48-years-at-icsid-1972-2020-an-overview-of-.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ The 6 BITs which do not mention a cooling off period are: Egypt – Japan BIT (1977), Egypt – Netherlands BIT (1996), Egypt – Somalia BIT (1982), Egypt – Sweden BIT (1978), Egypt – Syrian Arab Republic BIT (1997), and Egypt – Tunisia BIT (1989)

¹⁴ Terminating Investment Treaties: Best Practices. International Institute for Sustainable Development. Pg.8  https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/terminating-treaty-best-practices-en.pdf

¹⁵ Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in Indonesia: A Paradigm Shift, Issues, and Challenges.” Academy of Legal, Ethical, and Regulatory Issues. https://www.abacademies.org/articles/bilateral-investment-treaties-bits-in-indonesia-a-paradigm-shift-issues-and-challenges-7019.html

¹⁶ Egypt Aims to Increase Foreign Direct Investment by 15%.” Business Today Egypt. https://www.businesstodayegypt.com/Article/1/4769/Egypt-aims-to-increase-foreign-direct-investment-by-15-in

Egypt adopted its first Investment Law in 1974 (Law No. 43 of 1974). The Investment Law has undergone a number of changes, and recently, a comprehensive legal framework was established to facilitate and protect foreign direct investment (FDI), primarily through Investment Law No. 72 of 2017. The legislation outlines the criteria for investment, provides substantive rights and protections for investors, and specifies recourse mechanisms.

a. Please list out any formal criteria imposed by such legislation / instrument (if any) concerning the admission and divestment of foreign investment;

Investment Law No. 72 of 2017 sets forth the following criteria for the admission and divestment of foreign investments:

• Legal Form and Registration: Foreign investors are required to establish a legal entity in Egypt, such as a joint-stock company, limited liability company, or branch office. These entities must be registered with the ‘Investor Service Centre’ at the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (“GAFI”).¹⁷
• Sectoral Restrictions: While the law permits foreign investment across various sectors, as enumerated under Article1 of the aforementioned law, certain industries may have specific restrictions or require additional approvals. For instance, investments in strategic sectors such as military-related industries, tobacco, and certain areas of the media may be subject to limitations or require further approvals.¹⁸
• Freedom of Ownership and Divestment: Foreign investors are entitled to own, manage, use, expand, and liquidate their investments from abroad without restrictions.¹⁹

b. Please list out what substantive right(s) and protection(s) foreign investors enjoy under such legislation / instrument;

Under Investment Law No. 72 of 2017, foreign investors are accorded several substantive rights and protections, including:

• Guarantee Against Expropriation: Investment projects cannot be nationalized. Investment property may not be expropriated except for public utility purposes and with fair and proportionate compensation paid in advance of the day preceding the expropriation decision date. These acquisitions may not be issued by mere administrative procedures. They must be backed by a final, irrevocable court order.²⁰
• Repatriation of Profits: Investors have the right to repatriate profits, dividends, and liquidation proceeds in foreign currency without restrictions.²¹
• National and Equal Treatment: Foreign investors are entitled to treatment no less favourable than that accorded to domestic investors, ensuring a reduction of barriers to entry and freedom from arbitrary procedures.²²
• Import/Export Privileges: Investment projects can directly import production supplies, as well as export products, without requiring registration as importers/exporters.²³

c. Please list out what recourse (if any) a foreign investor has against the home state in respect of its rights under such legislation / instrument; and

Foreign investors have several recourse mechanisms under Section V (Settlement of Investment Disputes) of the Investment Law No. 72 of 2017:

• Judicial System: Investors retain the right to seek redress through the Egyptian judicial system, which includes specialized economic courts for commercial disputes.
• Dispute Resolution Committees: Chapter V of the Investment law establishes committees (The Grievance Committee), within the Investment Authority, to amicably resolve disputes between investors and State entities. The purpose of the committees is to enable swift and equitable solutions.²⁴
• Arbitration: Investors may resort to arbitration as a means of dispute resolution based on their agreements with the State or under the relevant BITs or Multilateral Investment Treaties (“MITs”). Egypt is a signatory to the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention, facilitating the enforcement of arbitral awards. In addition, the Egyptian Arbitration Law No.27 of 1994 (the “Arbitration Act”) recognises the provisions of international conventions, the conditions for the validity of the arbitration agreement, and the enforcement or annulment of arbitral awards in Egypt.²⁵

d. Does this legislation regulate the use of third-party funding and other non-conventional means of financing.

The Arbitration Act does not mention the notion of third-party funding. This is the case also for other Arbitration Laws which are similarly based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, it does not mean that it does not/cannot materialise through indirect forms of financing, which do not contradict matters of public policy in Egypt.

Egyptian Courts are yet to have the opportunity to fully assess the notion of third-party funding. Yet, there is no indication in law or policy which precludes the possibility of obtaining such funding.

In response to the increasing prevalence of third-party funding in arbitration, CRCICA has addressed this issue in its 2024 Arbitration Rules. Article 53 mandates that any party benefiting from third-party funding must disclose the existence of such funding and the identity of the funder, at the commencement of the arbitration and throughout the proceedings. This requirement aims to enhance transparency and prevent potential conflicts of interest in arbitrations administered under CRCICA’s auspices.²⁶

Footnote(s):

¹⁷ Investment Law No. 72 of 2017, Article 21.

¹⁸ Ibid, Article 1 and 3.

¹⁹ Ibid, Article 6.

²⁰ Ibid, Article 4.

²¹ Ibid, Article 6.

²² Ibid, Article 3.

²³ Investment Law No. 72 of 2017, Article 7.

²⁴ Investment Law No. 72 of 2017, Article 83.

²⁵ Arbitration Act No.27/1994, Article 55.

²⁶ Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), Arbitration Rules (2024), available at https://crcica.org/arbitration/crcica-arbitration-rules.

Yes, Egypt has frequently appeared as a respondent in investment treaty arbitration, reflecting its active engagement in international investment disputes. To date, 46 investment treaty cases have been registered against Egypt, including 38 under the ICSID.²⁷ This makes Egypt the fourth most frequent respondent state globally, following Argentina, Venezuela, and Spain. The State’s position is partly due to its status as one of the top 10 signatories of BITs, with 72 treaties in force.

Additionally, the politico-economic upheaval following the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 triggered 22 BIT claims against the State. Of the cases filed, six (6) are currently pending, fifteen (15) were settled, sixteen (16) were decided in favour of Egypt, five (5) in favour of investors, and in one case, liability was found but no damages were awarded.²⁸

Proactive Defence in Jurisdictional Matters: Egypt actively contests the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, particularly in cases where the investment or investor may not meet the criteria stipulated under the applicable BITs or the ICSID Convention. According to available ISDS databases, Egypt has successfully obtained 10 bifurcation requests on jurisdictional issues from ICSID tribunals. Egypt prevailed entirely in three of those requests due to lack of jurisdiction, while two claims were partially dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

An example of partial dismissal is H&H Enterprises Investments, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15).²⁹ In this case, the U.S.-based claimant brought claims under the Egypt – US BIT, alleging violations such as expropriation, denial of justice, and denial of effective means. Egypt raised multiple jurisdictional objections, leading the tribunal to bifurcate the proceedings. The tribunal ultimately found that some claims were inadmissible due to a fork-in-the-road provision in the BIT, which prevents investors from pursuing the same dispute in multiple forums. However, the tribunal retained jurisdiction over certain allegations, such as claims related to corruption and denial of justice, allowing those to proceed to the merits stage.

By contrast in Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11), Egypt successfully argued that the dispute did not qualify as an “investment” under Article 1 of the Egypt-UK BIT. The tribunal agreed, leading to a complete dismissal of the claim for lack of jurisdiction. Unlike H&H Enterprises, this case did not involve a partial dismissal but rather a full rejection at the jurisdictional stage.³⁰

Substantive Defence on Merits: In cases that proceed beyond jurisdiction, Egypt engages fully in defending its actions on substantive grounds. For example, in Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11), Egypt defended its actions regarding disruptions in a gas supply agreement, citing national security concerns due to unrest during the 2011 political upheaval.³¹ Although the tribunal ruled partially against Egypt, the State’s detailed defence highlighted its proactive approach to justifying State measures under exceptional circumstances.³²

Approach to Adverse Awards:  Egypt adopts a strategic approach to adverse arbitral awards, seeking to challenge unfavourable rulings through annulment proceedings in ICSID cases and resisting enforcement under the New York Convention for non-ICSID awards, particularly by invoking a public policy defence. In Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, Egypt sought annulment based on procedural irregularities but was unsuccessful.³³ For non-ICSID awards, Egypt has invoked the public policy defence under the New York Convention, as seen in Middle East Cement Shipping v. Egypt.³⁴ The State also negotiates post-award settlements to mitigate financial or reputational impacts, exemplified by its resolution with Siemens AG and others.³⁵

Settlement and Amicable Resolution: Egypt has shown a willingness to settle disputes amicably. Of the 46 cases, 15 were settled, indicating a preference for negotiated resolutions when feasible.³⁶

Engagement with International Legal Frameworks: Egypt has remained steadfast in its commitment to international arbitration frameworks, despite facing significant politico-economic challenges. As a signatory to numerous BITs, and a contracting State to the ICSID Convention, Egypt recognizes arbitration as a viable mechanism for resolving investment disputes. The aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution saw 22 BIT claims invoked against Egypt, creating a scenario that might have tempted policymakers to follow the example of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in withdrawing from the ICSID Convention, or terminating BITs. Nevertheless, Egypt chose to uphold its treaty obligations, even amidst the economic strain following several currency devaluations and the high probability of paying substantial awards to claimant investors. This decision was further reinforced by the need to protect the IMF loan agreement concluded in 2016. Egypt sought to avoid actions, such as denouncing treaty obligations or facing large arbitration awards, that could jeopardize the IMF loan agreement.

Footnote(s):

²⁷ UNCTAD, ‘Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: Egypt – Cases as Home State of claimant’, ICSID, ‘Cases database’.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ ICSID, H&H Enterprises Investments, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARB/09/15) Decision on Jurisdiction, available at: https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7979.pdf

³⁰ ICSID, Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11), Award on Jurisdiction, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/

³¹ ICSID, Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11), Final Award, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/

³² Ibid.

³³ ICSID, Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/

³⁴ New York Convention, Middle East Cement Shipping v. Egypt, available at: https://newyorkconvention.org/

³⁵ ICSID, Siemens AG v. Arab Republic of Egypt, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/

³⁶ UNCTAD, ‘Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: Egypt – Cases as Home State of claimant’, ICSID, ‘Cases database’.

Egypt has not been widely selected as the seat for non-ICSID investment treaty arbitrations. That said, Egypt’s legal system supports the enforcement of non-ICSID awards, particularly pursuant to the New York Convention. Egyptian courts have demonstrated arbitration-friendly practices, affirming their respect for international arbitration frameworks and awards.

For instance, the Egyptian Court of Cassation has explicitly recognized the primacy of the New York Convention over domestic arbitration laws, including the Arbitration Act.³⁷ In Cassation No. 10350 of Judicial Year 65 (1999), the Court of Cassation confirmed that the provisions of the New York Convention are an intrinsic part of Egyptian law, even if they conflict with the Arbitration Act.¹ Similarly, in Cassation No. 966 of Judicial Year 73 (2005), the Court reiterated that the Convention prevails over national laws when enforcing foreign arbitral awards, thereby safeguarding enforcement within Egypt.³⁸

The Egyptian administrative courts have also shown deference to investment treaty arbitration in certain rulings. For example, a 2008 administrative court decision (judgment No. 12663 of Judicial Year 59) upheld the res judicata effect of an ICSID award in favour of a Greek investor, refusing to re-examine the dispute even though the award required Egypt to pay compensation.³⁹

While Egypt’s role as a seat for non-ICSID investment treaty arbitrations is limited, the national courts’ rulings highlight the judiciary’s arbitration-friendly approach, and their commitment to international arbitration norms, making it a supportive jurisdiction for enforcement.

Footnote(s):

³⁷ Egyptian Court of Cassation, Cassation No. 10350 for Judicial Year 65 (1999).

³⁸ Egyptian Court of Cassation, Cassation No. 966 for Judicial Year 73 (2005).

³⁹ Administrative Court Judgment No. 12663 for Judicial Year 59 (2008).

The Arbitration Act empowers both arbitral tribunals and national courts to grant interim and preliminary measures in order to support arbitral proceedings⁴⁰:

• Arbitral Tribunals: Article 24 allows arbitral tribunals to order necessary interim or conservatory measures, concerning the dispute’s subject matter, provided the parties have agreed to confer such authority upon the tribunal.
• National Courts: Article 14 permits parties to request interim measures from Egyptian courts, either before or during arbitration. Such measures may include the preservation of evidence, attachment of assets, or other actions necessary to safeguard the parties’ rights pending the arbitration’s outcome.

Egyptian courts support arbitration by ultimately enforcing interim measures and applying the New York Convention. The Court of Cassation in Cassation No. 10350 of Judicial Year 65 (1999) affirmed that the New York Convention prevails over conflicting domestic laws, ensuring foreign awards, including interim measures, are enforceable.⁴¹ Courts generally avoid interference in arbitration, maintaining tribunals’ independence.

This supportive legal environment strengthens Egypt’s position as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction for both ICSID and non-ICSID proceedings.

Footnote(s):

⁴⁰ Arbitration Act No. 27 of 1994, Articles 14, 24

⁴¹ Egyptian Court of Cassation, Cassation No. 10350 for Judicial Year 65 (1999).

Pursuant to Article 17 of the Arbitration Act, the default procedures for appointing arbitrators are as follows:

• Number of Arbitrators: If the arbitration agreement does not specify the number of arbitrators, the default is a panel of three. This ensures an odd number, which is mandatory under Egyptian law to prevent deadlock situations.
• Appointment Process: Each party appoints one arbitrator. The two appointed arbitrators then select the third arbitrator, who acts as the presiding arbitrator. If a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days of receiving a request, or if the two arbitrators cannot agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days of their appointment, the competent court intervenes to make the necessary appointments.

Egyptian courts, play a supportive role in constituting arbitral tribunals when parties cannot agree on appointments. In such cases, the court appoints the required arbitrator(s) to ensure the arbitration proceeds without undue delay. The courts’ decisions in this regard are final and not subject to appeal, reflecting a commitment to facilitating arbitration.

In the context of investment treaty arbitrations seated in Egypt, the courts adhere to these default procedures, ensuring that arbitrator appointments align with both the parties’ agreements and the legal framework. This approach highlights Egypt’s dedication to; (i) maintaining an arbitration-friendly environment, and (ii) providing judicial assistance when necessary to uphold the integrity and efficiency of the arbitral process.

In the context of awards issued in non-ICSID investment treaty arbitrations, the applicable rules governing the annulment of such an award is generally provided for within the relevant BIT, and it is typically determined to be the national law of the State or the seat of arbitration.⁴² This would render the Arbitration Act as the governing framework for annulment proceedings.⁴³ Additionally, as explained above, Egypt, as a signatory to the New York Convention, has incorporated its standards, along with domestic mechanisms, when enforcing or annulling arbitral awards within its jurisdiction.⁴⁴

Under Articles 53 of the Arbitration Act, the available grounds for annulling an award include:

1. If there is no arbitration agreement, or such an agreement is void, voidable, or has expired;
2. If one of the parties during the conclusion of the arbitration agreement was fully or partially incapacitated;
3. If one of the parties was unable to present their defense due to the lack of proper notification regarding; the arbitration proceedings, the appointment of arbitrators, or for any other reason beyond their control;
4. If the arbitral award does not apply the law chosen by the parties for application to the subject matter of the dispute;
5. If the arbitral tribunal was formed, or the arbitrators appointed, in a manner which does not comply with the law or the agreement of the parties;
6. If the arbitral award deals with matters not agreed, or covered, by the arbitration agreement, or exceeds the limits of such an agreement. Noting that, if such parts can be separated from the matters which relate to the arbitration agreement, then the annulment shall apply only to the latter part; or
7. If the arbitral award is invalid, or the arbitration proceedings are invalid in a manner that affects the award; and
8. The court hearing the nullity claim shall have the discretion to nullify awards that are contrary to public order in Egypt.

When it comes to court practices in applying these grounds, Egypt has been described as an arbitration-friendly seat, especially, when it comes to claims regarding public policy.⁴⁵ Egyptian courts have demonstrated a willingness to uphold the validity of arbitration clauses, and they have widened the scope of matters which may be arbitrated beyond traditional limitations.⁴⁶ This proactive stance has contributed to Egypt’s reputation as a favorable arbitration seat.

Footnote(s):

⁴² ICSID v. Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, Pietro Bernardini (2009) Pg. 24 https://cdn.arbitration-icca.org/s3fs-public/document/media_document/media012970223709030bernardini_icsid-vs-non-icsid-investent.pdf

⁴³ ICSID and Non-ICSID Awards. Jus Mundi. https://jusmundi.com/en/document/publication/en-icsid-and-non-icsid-awards.

⁴⁴ Egypt. The Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review 2024. Global Arbitration Review. https://globalarbitrationreview.com/review/the-middle-eastern-and-african-arbitration-review/2025/article/egypt#footnote-060-backlink

⁴⁵ Ismail Selim, ‘Egyptian Public Policy as a Ground for Annulment and Refusal of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards’, (2016), 3, BCDR International Arbitration Review, Issue 1, pp. 65-79, https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/BCDR+International+Arbitration+Review/3.1/BCDR2016006

⁴⁶ Egypt.” The Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review 2023. Global Arbitration Review. available at:  https://globalarbitrationreview.com/review/the-middle-easter-and-african-arbitration-review/2023/article/egypts~text-An%20award%20may%20be%20annulled%20a%20complete%20absence%20of%20reasoning%20

Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention obligates all states to enforce ICSID awards as if such an award had been rendered by the court of that state.⁴⁷ Therefore, ICSID awards cannot be challenged in national courts. Recourse can only be made in accordance to the ICSID regime, for example; by utilizing the post-award remedies stipulated in Article 48 of the ICSID Convention, or based on the annulment criteria detailed in Article 52.⁴⁸ Post-award remedies include requesting supplementary decision, or rectification, interpretation, revision, or annulment.⁴⁹ Thus, there are no available grounds for challenging an ICSID award in Egypt.

Footnote(s):

⁴⁷ John Merrills, Eric De Brabandere Merrill’s International Dispute Settlement, The Validity of the Award and its Implementation (2022) Pg. 189

⁴⁸ ICSID Publishes Updated Background Paper on Annulment. (2024) available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/icsid-publishes-updated-background-paper-annulment#:~:text=Background%20on%20Annulment%20Under%20the,be%20challenged%20before%20national%20courts.

⁴⁹ Post-Award Remedies – ICSID Convention Arbitration (2022 Rules) available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/procedures/arbitration/convention/post-award-remedies/2022

It has been internationally established that the existence of a valid arbitration agreement prevents states from using the sovereign immunity defence in response to an arbitration award. The arbitration agreement is considered an implied waiver of the state’s immunity.⁵⁰  Nonetheless, Article 55 of the ICSID Convention specifically provides that the Convention does not derogate from domestic law concerning immunity from execution.⁵¹ Article 1 of the Arbitration Act stipulates that; the consent of the relevant administration is mandatory for signing an arbitration agreement between a governmental entity and an investor in order to ensure its validity.⁵² Without such consent, sovereign immunity is not considered to be waived, and the State can invoke sovereign immunity from suit.

This is further reiterated in the Prime Minister’s Decree No. 2592 of 2020, which provides the Supreme Commission with, among other things, the discretion to approve State contracts, especially the clause on international arbitration and other governing clauses (i.e. force majeure clause). Administrative entities of ministries, public authorities, governmental entities, administrative bodies, including ministries, public bodies, government agencies, their affiliated bodies, or companies affiliated with the State, or in which the State contributes in any way, cannot take certain decisions without first referring them to the Supreme Commission. This includes entering into a contract with a foreign investor, or any contract which includes international arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism.⁵³

Sovereign immunity from execution for public assets, or State-owned assets, can be invoked pursuant to Article 87 of the Egyptian Civil Code.

There are several uncertainties regarding the implementation of the aforementioned framework that are yet to be clarified. For example, the definition of governing clauses that the Commission shall review, and to what extent is a contract considered a State contract for the purposes of this Decree.

Footnote(s):

⁵⁰ International Investment Arbitration, Lessons from Developments in the MENA Region (2013) Pg. 80

⁵¹ Sovereign Immunity from Execution in Enforcement. Jus Mundi, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/publication/en-sovereign-inmunity-from-execution-in-enforcement

⁵² International Investment Arbitration, Lessons from Developments in the MENA Region, Dr. Mohamed A.M. Ismail (2013) Pg. 81

⁵³ Prime Ministers Decree 2592 of 2020, Regarding the replacement of the Articles of Prime Ministerial Resolution No. 1062 of 2019

The grounds upon which the recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards may be contested are primarily jurisdictional, particularly if the Egyptian government has not expressly consented to resolve a dispute through arbitration.⁵⁴ Article 1 of the Arbitration Act provides that, in the context of administrative contract disputes, any agreement to submit to arbitration must be approved by the competent minister to ensure its validity and enforceability.⁵⁵ More recently, the approval and ‘no objection’ of the Higher Commission for Studying and Opining on International Arbitration Cases, established by the Prime Minister, has become necessary for the validity of an arbitration agreement.⁵⁶ Should such approval not be granted, state immunity would not be considered waived in accordance with ICSID rules. Therefore, for ICSID jurisdiction to be valid, there must be either; (i) an explicit agreement between the contracting party and the investor, (ii) consent in the national legislation, or (iii) explicit consent within the relevant BIT.⁵⁷

A notable case which highlights the implications of filing an arbitration claim in the absence of a formal arbitration agreement is the case of Southern Pacific Properties v. The Arab Republic of Egypt. The claimant relied on superseded Article 8 of the Egyptian Investment Law No. 43, arguing that it constituted the State’s consent to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration.⁵⁸ Article 8 refers to resolving disputes within the ICSID framework where applicable. However, Egypt contended that this provision did not constitute consent to arbitrate but merely supplied arbitration as an option.⁵⁹ The ICSID tribunal ultimately ruled that it had jurisdiction, although the law was later amended to eliminate any implied or explicit consent for arbitration in domestic law.

Footnote(s):

⁵⁴ International Investment Arbitration, Lessons from Developments in the MENA Region (2013) Pg. 81

⁵⁵ International Investment Arbitration, Lessons from Developments in the MENA Region (2013) Pg. 82

⁵⁶ New Approval Required for Government Contracts and Arbitration Agreements in Egypt, Fatma Salah (2021) https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2021/02/21/new-approval-required-for-government-contracts-and-arbitration-agreements-in-egypt/#:~:text=2592%20of%202020%20(%E2%80%9CDecree%E2%80%9D,and%20arbitration%20agreements%20before%20execution.

⁵⁷ Bilateral Investment Treaties. UNCTAD. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edmmisc232add2_en.pdf

⁵⁸ Southern Pacific Properties Middle East Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt – Award.”Jus Mundi. https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-southern-pacific-properties-muddle-east-limited-v-arab-republic-of-egypt-award-wednesday-20th-may-1992.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Non-ICSID awards are subject to the law of the seat of arbitration. As previously discussed, in Egypt, this is specifically covered under Article 53 of the Arbitration Act.⁶⁰ Article 53 details all the possible grounds for challenging the recognition or enforcement of an award.

Appeal No. 15 of 2020 provides an example of when an annulment is refused, even when relying on one of the specified grounds for seeking it. The Court of Appeal ruled that claims alleging that the tribunal exceeded its mandate, as outlined in the relevant arbitration agreement, cannot serve as grounds for subsequent annulment of the award if they were not raised during the arbitral proceedings.⁶¹ The essence of the decision is that a party who initiates an arbitration and proceeds with it, knowing that the disputed matter falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, cannot later claim annulment based on the tribunal exceeding the mandate of the arbitration agreement.

Footnote(s):

⁶⁰ ICSID v. Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, Pietro Bernardini (2009) Pg. 26 https://cdn.arbitration-icca.org/s3fs-public/document/media_document/media012970223709030bernardini_icsid-vs-non-icsid-investent.pdf

⁶¹ Cairo Court of Appeal, Circuit (1), Challenge No. 15 of JY 137, dated 8 July 2020.

According to Article 87 of the Egyptian Civil Code, public assets may be movable or immovable property owned by the Egyptian State, or by public figures, which are allocated or used for the public’s benefit by virtue of a law, a decision, or decree of the competent minister. Assets characterized as public assets are immune from enforcement or execution and may not be disposed of or seized. On the other hand, assets held for commercial purposes do not enjoy such immunity.⁶² Article 88 of the Civil Code provides that; assets lose their public asset feature when used for non-public purposes. This can also be established through a law, a decree, by any other action, or by the natural end of the purpose for which those funds were allocated. A separate waiver for enforcement is required pertaining to public assets, if they remain characterized as such. Article 55 of the ICSID Convention confirms that a there should be no derogation from domestic laws concerning the State’s immunity from execution.

Article 55 provides that:

“Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.”

Footnote(s):

⁶² Egyptian Civil Code, Article 87(2)

Over the past decade, Egypt has experienced a significant increase in investor-state claims, ranking among the top respondent states in ICSID arbitrations. This surge is partly due to Egypt’s extensive network of BITs, most of which reference the ICSID Convention. As of March 2020, Egypt was the fourth most frequent respondent state, following Argentina, Venezuela, and Spain, with 34 cases filed against it, representing 4.6% of total registered ICSID cases.⁶³ Despite facing numerous claims, Egypt has chosen to remain within the ISDS framework, distinguishing itself from countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and South Africa, which have withdrawn from certain international arbitration mechanisms. Egypt continues to engage actively in arbitration proceedings, adhering to global standards in both commercial and ISDS-related matters.

A notable trend is the concentration of disputes in the energy and tourism sectors. Approximately 20% of cases involving Egypt pertain to the oil, gas, and mining industries, with 86% of these filed since 2011, reflecting the impact of the 2011 revolution on investment agreements. The tourism sector accounts for about 17% of cases, emphasising its significance in Egypt’s investment landscape.⁶⁴ In response to these challenges, Egypt has implemented reforms in the energy sector and resolved major disputes. The discovery of the Zohr natural gas field in 2015, the largest in the Mediterranean, with an estimated 30 trillion cubic feet of gas, marked a pivotal step towards energy self-sufficiency and restoring investor confidence.⁶⁵

Legally, Egypt has recently undertaken significant reforms in its arbitration framework. In December 2020, the Egyptian Prime Minister issued Decree No. 2592, requiring governmental entities and State-owned companies to obtain approval from the High Committee for Arbitration and International Disputes before concluding or amending contracts with foreign investors, or contracts including arbitration clauses in general. The committee is also responsible for approving international expert houses, the arbitrators suitable for the nature of each dispute, and the law firms that will be entrusted with defending the Egyptian State in arbitration disputes.⁶⁶ These measures are intended to ensure alignment with national interests and greater oversight of agreements involving foreign investors.⁶⁷

In 2022, the country introduced a new model BIT that incorporates provisions reflecting reforms in global arbitration standards. This model also revises the dispute resolution mechanism of previous BITs, reintroducing references to ICSID arbitration under more stringent conditions.⁶⁸

In January 2024, CRCICA unveiled its new Arbitration Rules, which introduced several provisions not present in the 2011 rules. The additions include mechanisms for consolidation, multiparty and multiple contract arbitrations, third-party funding, emergency arbitrators, and expedited procedures.⁶⁹

Politically, Egypt has maintained policies that promote foreign direct investment (FDI), even amid economic challenges such as currency volatility and reliance on IMF financing. The government has avoided protectionist measures, instead fostering partnerships with Gulf states and other foreign investors. Its macroeconomic strategy focuses on reducing public debt through the sale of State-owned assets and encouraging hard currency inflows, aligning with its commitment to an investment-friendly economy.⁷⁰

Footnote(s):

⁶³ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. (2024). The ICSID Caseload—Statistics (Issue 2024-2). available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/2024-2%20ENG%20-%20The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%28Issue%202024-2%29.pdf

⁶⁴ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. (2024). The ICSID Caseload—Statistics (Issue 2024-2). available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/2024-2%20ENG%20-%20The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%28Issue%202024-2%29.pdf.

⁶⁵ “Zohr Project Overview,” Eni S.p.A., available at: https://www.eni.com/en-IT/actions/global-activities/egypt/zohr.html.

⁶⁶ “New Approval Required for Government Contracts and Arbitration Agreements in Egypt,” Kluwer Arbitration Blog, February 21, 2021, available at: https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2021/02/21/new-approval-required-for-government-contracts-and-arbitration-agreements-in-egypt/

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Abdel Wahab, M. S., & Khaled, N. (2024). Egypt: Recent Developments in Arbitration Law. Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online, 23(1), 329-339. https://doi.org/10.1163/22112987-20230058

⁶⁹ Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), Draft Arbitration Rules 2023,” available at: https://crcica.org/rules/arbitration/text/draft_cr_Arb_Rules_2023_EN.pdf

⁷⁰ Reuters. (2024, October 15). Saudi crown prince visits Cairo to discuss investment, Middle East crises. available at: from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-visits-cairo-discuss-investment-middle-east-crises-2024-10-15/

Beyond the domestic legal reforms mentioned above, Egypt has not stated an intent not to renew certain investment treaties, and it has not renounced, or stated an intent to renounce, its ratification of the ICSID Convention. In addition, Egypt has not announced that it will not agree to investor-state dispute settlement provisions in future investment treaties, and it has not made official statements regarding its international legal obligations under current or future treaties.

As previously mentioned, in October 2024, Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed a BIT for the purpose of encouraging and protecting mutual investments between the two nations.⁷¹ This represents a major legal development between these two key investment partners, creating mutual protection incentives that go beyond the Economic Cooperation Agreement concluded in 1990.⁷² The new BIT aims to significantly elevate joint investment levels, fostering economic cooperation and development.

Footnote(s):

⁷¹ “Egypt, Saudi Arabia sign accords to encourage mutual investment, form supreme coordination council,” Egypt Today, October 16, 2024, available at: https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/135398/Egypt-Saudi-Arabia-sign-accords-to-encourage-mutual-investment-form

⁷² “Agreement on Economic, Commercial, Investment and Technical Cooperation between the Governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” December 18, 1990. Egypt – Saudi Arabia (1990), available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bilateral-investment-treaties/5160/egypt—saudi-arabia-bit-1990