Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution sets out the main principles of economic competition policy and the institutional framework for the competition authority. It also provides for the prohibition of monopolies and monopolistic practices.

As will be explained below, a constitutional reform to Article 28, enacted in December 2024, provides for the replacement of the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE or Commission) and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) by a new competition authority under the Ministry of Economy. At this stage, secondary legislation has not been approved by Congress, hence, the transition is expected to be completed during the ongoing year.

For its parts, the Federal Economic Competition Law (FECL or LFCE, by its Spanish acronym) regulates, among other matters , the procedures for investigating and, where appropriate, sanctioning absolute monopolistic practices (cartel conduct), relative monopolistic practices (abuse of dominance and vertical restraints) and unlawful concentrations.

In this context, the FECL distinguishes between absolute monopolistic practices– hard-core cartels among competitors – and other, less pernicious anticompetitive conducts. Cartel agreements (price-fixing, supply reduction, market division, bid-rigging, or the exchange of information aimed at achieving any of these outcomes) are per se unlawful and do not require proof of actual market effects. This means that neither efficiency arguments nor economic justifications are valid grounds for exemption.

In other words, an agreement’s object or effect to restrain competition is sufficient to establish an infringement, and such agreements are deemed null and void by law. By contrast, non-cartel practices like vertical restraints or abuse of dominance are considered “relative” monopolistic practices assessed under a rule of reason and require demonstration of anti-competitive effects. Cartel conduct is broadly defined in Article 53 of the FECL, and no industry-specific exemptions or defences exist for these “absolute” practices.

It is worth noting that the IFT has initiated a few investigations related to cartels, so our focus will be on COFECE’s activities.

Under Mexican competition law, cartel infringements are assessed under a per se standard. Therefore, there is no requirement to prove that the alleged cartel infringement resulted in an anticompetitive effect such as higher prices or reduced output. In practice, the Investigative Authority (IA) of COFECE has primarily focused on proving the actual existence of the collusive agreement between competitors for adjudication purposes.

Although the statute targets agreements with the “object or effect” of fixing prices, limiting supply, allocating markets or rigging bids, the per se standard allows COFECE to sanction cartel conduct even where no actual impact on the market is demonstrated.

As mentioned, COFECE focuses on the conduct itself, and while it may analyse additional market indicators for the applicable sanction, there is no obligation to prove an anticompetitive effect. It is also worth noting that, under the current legal framework, there is no possibility to prove market efficiencies despite ongoing discussions that seek to modify this criterion due to its formalistic limitations.

The FECL applies to conducts that have effects within Mexican markets, even if they occur outside of the country. In line with international practice, the FECL asserts jurisdiction over agreements or additional conducts occurring abroad if such conducts produce anticompetitive effects in Mexico (for example, a price-fixing scheme formed overseas that raises prices for Mexican consumers).

In this context, it is worth noting that COFECE has conducted investigations on international cartels that have effects in Mexico. In some cases, these investigations have been carried out in coordination with other antitrust agencies under Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) or waivers. It is also likely that leniency applicants in other jurisdictions are inclined to approach COFECE considering this approach.

As part of the ongoing changes to the Mexican competition regulation, including the forthcoming replacement of COFECE and the IFT, once the new legislation is approved and enters into force, a new competition authority is expected to be created under the Ministry of Economy. This new agency will issue its organic statute which may include potential changes in its institutional structure. However, as of the first quarter of 2025, no significant structural changes have yet taken place.

Considering the above, at the time of writing, cartels are investigated and prosecuted in Mexico primarily by COFECE’s Investigative Authority. This unit is formed by five different General Directorates, one of which is a specific Cartels General Directorate tasked by conducting the investigation in accordance with the applicable procedure. In addition, the Investigative Authority also has an Intelligence General Directorate, which contributes throughout the process with specialized services such as data analysis and IT forensics.

In parallel, the IFT, has its own Investigative Authority including a specific General Directorate for anticompetitive conducts in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors.

Under Mexican law, cartel conduct constitutes both an administrative infringement as well as a criminal offense. COFECE and IFT, as administrative authorities, are responsible for conducting investigations and determining administrative sanctions under the FECL. In addition, criminal enforcement can be conducted by the Federal Attorney General’s Office (FGR) upon referral by the Investigative Authority of the antitrust agency. The previously mentioned authorities have exclusive jurisdiction at the federal level as there is no state-level antitrust enforcement.

Other agencies (such as sector regulators or consumer protection authorities) do not investigate cartels themselves, although they may cooperate or refer matters to the competition authorities.

As of now, COFECE and IFT are constitutionally autonomous. However, when the legal reforms take effect, the new competition agency will fall within the Ministry of Economy, potentially changing the actual arrangements that contribute to the independent and technical criteria of the antitrust authority.

There are three main various sources for competition authorities to learn from potential cartel conduct: i) Formal complaints, ii) Leniency applications, and iii) Proactive detection.

Formal complaints have specific procedural and substantial requirements under the FECL that need to be satisfied for the Investigative Authority to decide to start a cartel investigation. These include providing elements that sustain the existence of the potential collusive agreement and that the parties engaging in the suspected agreement are competitors. If these requirements are not met, the complaint may be dismissed by the Investigative Authority.

Leniency applications are a key tool for COFECE to start ex officio investigations. In this sense, any undertaking that may have engaged in a cartel may approach the Investigative Authority and request leniency from criminal prosecution in exchange for immunity or a reduced fine. This program is explained further below.

Additionally, the Investigative Authority has developed its proactive detection capabilities during the last decade, resulting in an increased number of ex officio investigations. The Intelligence General Directorate monitors priority markets identified as such by COFECE under its Strategic Plan. This unit leverages a combination of data science, economic analysis, technology and strategic market analysis to detect indications of anticompetitive conducts that would result in probable cause to start an investigation.

Referring to cartels, these may result from applying screening (both behavioural and structural) to datasets to identify flags of suspected collusive conduct. These may be related to price-specific patterns, for example, similar or exact prices of goods and services, or non-pricing factors, such as the behaviour of undertakings in relation with their competitors.

It is important to note that most of the competition agencies at this stage have pursued strengthening their proactive detection capabilities, with most results being notable in areas or markets that have a good degree of availability and quality of publicly available information. Thus, the sectors in which detection work has been effective are mostly in public procurement or regulated activities with public information.

Some other detection tools may include data and tech-based mechanisms to monitor market behaviour by gathering, processing and analysing large volumes of information. In addition, COFECE also has an anonymous reporting mailbox which allows the public to reach out to the competition agency and provide leads on potential anticompetitive conduct without the need to file a formal complaint.

There has been a significant increase in the number of ex officio investigations in the last years in strategic sectors defined as such by the agency, (such as public procurement, healthcare, construction, the financial sector and consumer goods to mention a few). In this sense, it is possible to consider that the focus of ex officio enforcement work will be related with specific sectors that are deemed as strategic.

It is also possible that information that ensues from different proceedings at COFECE can lead to cartel cases. For example, if during a merger review or an economic study there are indications of possible collusion, these are referred to the Investigative Authority for its consideration.

It could be argued that there is a significant degree of discretion by COFECE in determining on which cases it exercises its investigative powers related to ex officio enforcement. Even though the Strategic Plan is supposed to provide some degree of guidance for proactive enforcement work, there is no publicly available guidance for the selection of cases under this approach.

For the Investigative Authority to exercise its powers it must have a probable cause (causa objetiva) which provides a reasonable indication of the existence of a cartel under Article 53 of the FECL. In this sense, the IA must have at least preliminary signs of an anticompetitive agreement (written, oral, or otherwise) between competitors aimed at or with the effect of fixing prices, restricting supply, segmenting markets, coordinating in public tenders or exchanging information for such purposes.

After the previous stage, the Investigative Authority formally conducts the process under the following rules:

• Investigations for cartel conduct can last up to five periods of maximum 120 business days each, potentially reaching 600 business days for a single proceeding.
• After issuing the formal commencement of the investigation through a non-public document known as Acuerdo de Inicio, the proceedings will be kept confidential for the first period. At the beginning of the second period, the Investigative Authority publishes an extract providing general details on the market subject to investigation on the Official Gazette of the Federation.
• Throughout the investigation, the Investigative Authority can use different tools that range from dawn raids, information requirements, compulsory interviews, inspections, among other, to gather both direct and indirect evidence that proves the existence of the cartel. It is important to highlight that at this stage, the Investigative Authority will not indict and adjudicate any responsibility for alleged conduct.

Once the Investigative Authority decides to close the investigation it will order its formal conclusion (Acuerdo de Conclusión) and may determine the following. If there is sufficient evidence on the existence of the cartel, the Investigative Authority will issue a Statement of Probable Responsibility (SPR or Dictamen de Probable Responsabilidad). On the contrary, it may recommend closing the investigation due to the lack of sufficient evidence. In either case, these will be presented to the Board of Commissioners for the next stage in the process, which is the trial-like process (PSFJ).

During the trial-like phase in which the accused companies or individuals, otherwise identified as alleged offender(s) are formally notified of the charges and granted access to the file of evidence. They are given the opportunity to defend themselves by submitting arguments and additional evidence and may also be heard in an oral hearing. This phase is structured around a series of key deadlines, outlined below:

• The alleged offender(s) have 45 non-extendable business days to respond to the Statement of Probable Responsibility.
• The Investigative Authority then has 15 business days to present its position regarding the arguments and evidence submitted by the alleged offender(s).
• After this 15-day period, the Investigative Authority must decide on the admissibility or dismissal of the evidentiary materials provided by the alleged offender(s).
• Once the evidence is processed, the Commission has 10 business days to either order further evidence gathering or summon the alleged offender(s) for closing arguments.
• The case file is considered complete either on the date the closing arguments are submitted or upon the expiration of the ten-day period. From that point, the alleged offender(s) or the complainant have 10 business days to request an oral hearing before the Board of Commissioners to present any final statements.
• COFECE must then issue its final resolution within a non-extendable 40-business-day period.

The Board of Commissioners will deliberate and issue a final resolution, either finding an infringement (and imposing sanctions) or closing the case if evidence is insufficient. The entire process can be lengthy, as complex cartel cases often take two to three years from initiation to final decision, given the extensive fact-finding and procedural safeguards.

It is relevant to highlight that throughout the investigation, there is a statute of limitations of sorts: COFECE cannot initiate an investigation more than 10 years after the unlawful conduct ceased.

Following the 2014 Constitutional Reform on Competition, Broadcasting and Telecommunications, Mexico’s competition authorities were granted enhanced investigative powers. In some cases, these powers are comparable to those used by law enforcement agencies. Key investigative tools include:

• Requests for information and documents: COFECE can compel any person or entity (companies, executives, third parties) to produce relevant information, such as emails, business records, data, and communications.

These requests are legally enforceable, and non-compliance can lead to fines for obstruction. Importantly, COFECE’s jurisdiction to gather evidence extends to foreign entities if the information is necessary – the FECL explicitly allows the Investigative Authority to seek assistance from or request documents through foreign authorities in cartel cases. In some cases, there are collaboration agreements in place between agencies that facilitate implementing coordination in the use of investigative powers. Multinational companies under investigation often face parallel requests in multiple jurisdictions.

It is also possible for the agency to request submissions of relevant digital files in case these were not successfully collected during dawn raids (see below). The rise of messaging apps and remote work has presented challenges which have been solved by COFECE by acquiring devices and requesting individuals to provide information held in external servers. Failure to comply with an information request or any attempt to obstruct access to data can result in procedural sanctions such as fines.

• Dawn raids: Perhaps COFECE’s most powerful tool is the ability to conduct surprise on-site searches of business premises to copy information, in both digital and physical formats, that could be used as evidence of a cartel. The system provided by the FECL, specifically Article 75, allows the Head of the Investigative Authority to issue the dawn raid order and conduct it without the need for a court warrant​.

With the relevant dawn raid order, COFECE officers can enter and search the premises of the companies subject to investigation. During the raid, investigators can access any physical space (office, files) or digital storage (computers, servers, and other media)​ to copy information relevant for the investigation. The officers may also ask employees or representatives of the company questions on matters useful for their investigation.

Since 2014, COFECE has been using IT forensics to gather relevant information from digital devices. There are different methods and tools for such purposes. For example, acquiring full forensic images of hard drives or other devices, a bit-to-bit copy, by using software or hardware-based methods. It is also possible to acquire just relevant files or information stored in digital devices by generating a partial forensic copy.

During the last decade, COFECE has enhanced its capabilities to acquire digital information during dawn raids from diverse types of infrastructure arrangements. This may even include the possibility of accessing information stored remotely, both on servers and offsite computers, when there is a connection from the premises covered by the dawn raid order​. For instance, if employees use cloud-based email or document services, COFECE may copy those materials during the raid.

However, the law places some limits. COFECE cannot seize original documents or devices, nor can they detain individuals during a competition raid​. Despite an existing provision within FECL that refers to the possibility of ordering administrative arrests, there is no specific guidance that has been given on the matter nor any previous situation in which COFECE has successfully used this tool.

It is important to highlight that dawn raids must relate to the investigation’s defined scope – only evidence relevant to the suspected cartel should be collected not of any conduct or matter of interest-. It is also worth noting that dawn raids have been one of the most important investigative tools for COFECE, since it provides the agency with the possibility of acquiring direct evidence to determine the probable existence of a cartel.

• Compulsory interviews and testimony: During an investigation, COFECE can summon individuals (such as company executives, employees, or other witnesses) to appear and give testimony under oath​. These compulsory interviews allow the Investigative Authority to question people about facts and documents gathered throughout the investigation.

Interviewees must answer truthfully or face penalties for making false statements. While interrogations usually occur in person at COFECE’s offices, in recent times they can be arranged virtually as well (especially during pandemic conditions) if formalities are observed. FECL empowers COFECE to take sworn statements, which can be crucial firsthand evidence of a cartel’s operation. Usually, the strategy used by the agency includes a combination of gathering potential evidence in digital documents of the cartel and then confronting individuals during these interviews with the findings. Thus, there is a complementary approach to the use of both tools.

COFECE’s investigative toolkit is quite broad, enabling it to find indications and evidence even in well-hidden cartels. The agency has become increasingly adept at using these powers over the past decade. In addition, there have been major developments during the last 3 to 5 years due to the expanding use of economic and data analytics in ongoing cartel cases as in Mexico there is also the possibility to sustain a cartel allegation by using indirect evidence.

Through investigations, COFECE must respect certain legal boundaries. One key area is attorney-client privilege, which covers communications between a company and its external lawyers. Historically, Mexican law did not expressly codify attorney-client privilege in competition cases, but COFECE has issued guidelines and regulatory provisions to protect privileged documents. In a dawn raid, if documents are identified as attorney-client communications COFECE’s has different procedures to exclude these from the evidence file.

In 2021, COFECE adopted rules confirming that legal advice communications are protected and cannot be used as evidence. This protection applies only to communications with external lawyers, as courts have previously held that communications from in-house counsel are not protected by this privilege.

Thus, companies can invoke the privilege to withhold or seal documents that contain legal advice. The onus is on the company to assert privilege when a document is collected. In case of disputes, courts have reinforced that privileged documents should not be accessed by COFECE’s investigators.

It bears noting, however, that factual business communications (even if copied to a lawyer) are not protected – the privilege covers actual legal counsel. Also, communications with unlicensed advisors or between non-lawyers in a company remain fully discoverable.

Full leniency (immunity from fines, and disqualification and criminal liability for individuals) is available to the first cartel member to come forward and apply, provided that COFECE has not already been made aware of the conduct. Crucially, an immunity applicant must provide sufficient evidence to allow the authority to initiate or advance an investigation that might otherwise not succeed.

Typically, this means divulging the cartel’s participants, activities, and relevant records (emails, meeting notes, etc.). The applicant must also cease involvement in the cartel immediately and commit to ongoing full cooperation.

A formal admission of wrongdoing is inherent in the process – the applicant confesses its participation (although legally the admission is contained in confidential leniency statements). The timing is important: COFECE allows an immunity applicant to come in even after an investigation has begun, as long as no one else has already applied. Unlike some jurisdictions, Mexico does not bar leniency just because an investigation is underway; the first applicant can still get immunity so long as they beat their co-conspirators to the leniency office.

However, if COFECE has completed an investigation and issued formal charges, leniency may no longer be available – practically, one must apply before the authority has all the evidence it needs. The FECL (Art. 103) codifies these conditions, and COFECE’s Leniency Guidelines add procedural clarity.

Other cartel participants who are not first can still benefit from reduced penalties if they cooperate. The FECL and COFECE’s program provide a sliding scale of fine reductions for the second, third, and subsequent applicants: the second applicant may get up to a 50% reduction, the third up to 30%, and later ones up to 20%.

All such reductions are off the maximum fine applicable. To qualify, each subsequent applicant must provide “added value” evidence beyond what COFECE already has.

In practice, once one applicant has laid out the core evidence, later applicants often supplement it with additional documents or testimony strengthening the case or broadening the understanding of the cartel’s scope. They too must cease their conduct and cooperate fully.

Notably, only the first applicant is eligible for full immunity from fines; subsequent applicants, regardless of their level of cooperation, will still be subject to a fine (albeit significantly reduced). However, if the application is successful, none of the applicants will face criminal liability.

COFECE operates a marker system, allowing an applicant to reserve their place in line. An applicant can approach COFECE’s leniency contact (via phone or email to a dedicated “immunity” contact in the Cartels General Directorate) and request a marker indicating their intention to apply.

If granted, the applicant then has a brief period to gather information and perfect the application. This system helps because it can be a tight race between conspirators once one leaks. COFECE’s leniency point of contact is available 24/7 and keeps the identity of applicants strictly confidential.

The application itself can be made in writing or orally and must contain basic details of the cartel and evidence. From that point, COFECE will typically interview the applicant and review evidence in proffer sessions. A conditional leniency agreement is then signed, laying out the obligations of the applicant.

To qualify for the leniency programme, the applicant must acknowledge its participation in the cartel and cease the conduct, unless the Investigative Authority expressly requires continued participation temporarily to gather evidence (with a formal agreement).

It should also provide all relevant documents and evidence timely and truthfully, including any additional information that becomes available. Also, there is a prohibition on falsifying, destroying or hiding evidence.

The applicant must facilitate the cooperation of related persons (individuals or entities) within the same economic interest group. Lastly, during the trial-like phase, applicants must not deny their participation, must present further evidence if useful, and allow procedural actions by authorities.

Moreover, ff cooperating entity or individual fails to cooperate, COFECE may revoke the conditional leniency removing the benefits of the program for that person. Regarding confidentiality, as a rule both the Commission and applicants are required to maintain confidentiality throughout the process, including the actual application and documents submitted.

A significant feature of Mexico’s leniency system is that it covers criminal liability for individuals as well. Cartel conducts in Mexico can lead to criminal charges (imprisonment of 5 to 10 years) for the executives or persons involved, under the Federal Criminal Code.

Recognizing that this threat could deter companies and especially individuals from coming forward, the law provides that all leniency applicants (first-in and even subsequent ones) receive immunity from criminal prosecution.

In practice, this means if a company obtains leniency, the individuals from that company who admit involvement will not be referred for prosecution. Even second or third applicants’ cooperating individuals are protected from criminal charges – an important incentive for them to cooperate rather than stay silent out of fear of jail.

As previously mentioned, COFECE coordinates with the Federal Attorney General’s Office to ensure that leniency beneficiaries are not criminally prosecuted. Indeed, since 2014, the requirement of a final COFECE resolution for criminal action was removed, giving COFECE more flexibility to refer cases early, but it also strengthened the need to assure leniency applicants they will not be prosecuted.

To date, COFECE has initiated only a couple of criminal complaints for cartels, and those did not involve leniency applicants (they involved firms that fought the case). At this stage, there have not been any convictions resulting from these criminal complaints and the matters are still in progress at the Federal Attorney General.

Mexican antitrust legislation does not formally provide for an ‘amnesty plus’ programme akin to that found in jurisdictions such as the United States. If a participant in one cartel wishes to disclose the existence of a separate cartel operating in a different market, it must file a distinct leniency (immunity) application in respect of that second infringement.

The FECL does not currently envisage any additional benefit—such as a further reduction in sanctions in the original case—for cooperating in relation to an unrelated cartel. As such, while a party may secure immunity for the second cartel if it is the first to come forward and meets the statutory requirements, it cannot obtain a cumulative advantage in the first case simply by revealing the second.

Unlike some jurisdictions, Mexico does not have a settlement or plea-bargaining procedure for cartel cases that allows an investigated party to simply admit liability and obtain a reduced penalty. The concept of a negotiated settlement (short of full leniency) is absent in COFECE’s cartel enforcement. The FECL explicitly prohibits “absolute monopolistic practices” (cartels) and treats them as void and subject to sanction, leaving no room for a consensual resolution other than through leniency. In fact, the law provides only one route to avoid a sanction in a cartel case, which is the leniency programme explained previously.

The current competition legislation in Mexico does not provide mechanisms to expedite the Commission’s final decision or offer a settlement procedure. Therefore, if COFECE deems it necessary, the full investigation and trial-like procedure must be completed before a final resolution is issued.

COFECE cannot conclude a cartel investigation by accepting commitments or entering a settlement agreement as is possible before European or US authorities might. In abuse of dominance cases, COFECE may negotiate commitments to resolve the investigation without a finding of liability; however, such commitments are not available in cases involving hard-core cartels.

This reflects economic competition policy stance that cartels are so egregious that they must be pursued to a formal decision and sanctioned accordingly to ensure deterrence. Parties to a cartel investigation therefore have a binary choice: either fight the case or confess through leniency (if they are eligible and early enough). There is no intermediate settlement procedure to simply agree on the facts and receive a negotiated fine discount outside the leniency context.

As mentioned earlier, Mexico does not have a legal mechanism for settlement or plea bargaining in cartel cases. The FECL does not permit parties to negotiate reduced fines or avoid a full infringement decision through admission of liability.

As such, the only structured avenue for mitigating liability is through the leniency (immunity) programme, which operates under a separate legal framework and is available only under strict conditions. Consequently, cartel investigations always result either in a full decision finding infringement or in dismissal—there is no intermediate or negotiated resolution available.

The absence of a settlement mechanism imposes certain procedural and strategic consequences. On the one hand, COFECE’s decisions result in detailed public resolutions, that reinforce deterrence and aim to create binding legal precedents. Each case culminates in a formal, reasoned decision, which promotes transparency and avoids any perception of backroom deals or selective enforcement. This can enhance institutional credibility and public confidence in the agency’s independence and rigour.

However, the absence of a settlement mechanism also presents significant challenges. For both the Commission and the investigated parties, the process can be lengthy and resource intensive. Companies under investigation must engage in a full defence, incurring significant legal costs and operational disruption, even where they might otherwise be willing to acknowledge wrongdoing.

COFECE, in turn, must devote substantial resources to prosecute each case through to its conclusion—an issue that has become more pressing in light of recent budgetary constraints. Moreover, without settlement, there is no procedural pathway to achieve early resolution or procedural economy. Investigated firms also face heightened exposure to follow-on private damages claims, as the final infringement decision will typically contain detailed factual and legal findings that may assist civil claimants.

COFECE actively cooperates with other authorities both domestically and internationally in the fight against cartels. Domestic inter-agency cooperation is facilitated by statutory provisions and formal agreements. The FECL authorizes COFECE’s Investigative Authority to request assistance or information from any other public agency (federal or local) that may help its investigation.

In cartel cases, this often means working with sector regulators, procurement authorities, or law enforcement bodies. For example, COFECE has memoranda of understanding with agencies like the Ministry of Economy, the Central Bank, the Consumer Protection Agency​, among other local and federal government agencies.

Through these MOUs, COFECE can obtain data or expertise (such as market statistics, audit reports, or market monitoring findings) to support its investigations. A concrete illustration is COFECE’s coordination with the now extinct Ministry of Public Administration (Secretaría de la Función Pública) to tackle bid-rigging in government contracts – an agreement in 2019 established protocols for sharing information on suspicious procurement patterns.

Similarly, COFECE may rely on the Federal Audit Office or other oversight bodies to flag collusion risks in public spending. During dawn raids, COFECE requests police support to ensure safety and to secure premises, demonstrating cooperation between the competition enforcers and law enforcement.

In the global aspect, cartels frequently transcend borders, and COFECE engages foreign competition authorities to tackle such cases. Mexico is a party to cooperation agreements via trade deals like USMCA (formerly NAFTA) and other bilateral accords that include competition chapters. Under these agreements, COFECE exchanges information and coordinates with counterparts, particularly the United States (US) Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Canada’s Competition Bureau.

In global cartel investigations (for instance, in industries like the fragrance market), COFECE has liaised with the DOJ and the Competition and Markets Authority (UK), to conduct simultaneous dawn raids or share leads. While Mexican law allows sharing confidential information with foreign enforcers only with appropriate safeguards (often requiring waivers from leniency applicants or parties due to confidentiality rules), in practice, companies involved in multi-jurisdictional cartels often grant such waivers so that authorities can coordinate. This can lead to coordinated leniency: a company might apply for leniency in several countries around the same time. COFECE recognises leniency markers from other jurisdictions as a prompt to act quickly – for example, if a cartel is detected in the U.S. and it affected Mexico, COFECE would expect a leniency application soon or might proactively reach out through liaison channels.

COFECE is also an active member of the International Competition Network (ICN) and the OECD’s Competition Committee, through which it exchanges enforcement techniques and experiences. These forums promote convergence on cartel enforcement practices. Informally, COFECE officials maintain relationships with colleagues in Europe, South America, and Asia, which can be useful if a cartel investigation requires informal information exchange (subject to legal boundaries). For instance, COFECE coordinated with authorities in several countries during the investigation of an international maritime transportation cartel (car carrier cartel), ensuring a degree of consistency in approach.

On the other hand, when a cartel has been sanctioned in other jurisdictions, COFECE does not automatically excuse it in Mexico; each jurisdiction’s enforcement is independent. However, a settlement or leniency in another country can indirectly assist COFECE. If a firm settled in the EU or the US, it might have admitted facts that COFECE could later use (if obtained lawfully).

Moreover, companies often opt to apply for leniency in Mexico if they have done so elsewhere, to maximize global protection. COFECE will generally treat a foreign leniency (or settlement) as no bar to its own action – the company must come forward in Mexico separately to gain leniency here. That said, COFECE is mindful of not duplicating efforts unnecessarily. In some past cases, COFECE launched investigations after foreign authorities publicly penalised a cartel, using the foreign decision as a clue. But COFECE will still gather its own evidence under Mexican procedures.

Cartel conduct, once established by COFECE, carries severe administrative penalties. FECL authorizes COFECE to impose a fine of up to 10% of the annual revenue of the given company for incurring in a cartel.

This cap is calculated based on the company income, typically its turnover in the year prior to the resolution. In practice, COFECE will assess the harm and size of the cartel to set the fine, but it cannot exceed 10% of each company’s annual turnover. In addition, individuals (such as managers or directors) who participated in the cartel on behalf of a company can be fined up to an amount indexed to currency, equal to 200,000 times the Measurement and Updating Unit (UMA)¹.

COFECE also has the power to impose disqualification sanctions on individuals: an executive who engaged in cartel behaviour can be banned from serving as a director or officer of any company for up to 5 years. This “director disqualification” is an additional penalty meant to personally deter corporate decision-makers. Although used sparingly so far, it signals to executives that their career may be on the line if they collude.

For recidivists, the FECL allows even harsher measures: if an economic agent repeats a cartel offence, COFECE can fine it up to double the normal percentage (i.e. 20% of turnover) and even order the divestiture of assets if needed to eliminate market power.

COFECE’s fines in practice vary depending on factors like the duration of the cartel, the damage caused, the market share of participants, and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

However, in many domestic cartels (especially those involving smaller enterprises), fines have been more modest – often a few tens of millions of pesos – reflecting the smaller size of those actors and markets. The law’s 10% cap has not yet truly been tested against a giant multinational in a large market; one could imagine, for instance, if a tech or energy cartel were found, the 10% of a huge turnover would be enormous, but so far cases have been more moderate in scope.

On top of administrative penalties, individuals who participate in a cartel face criminal liability under Article 254 bis of the Federal Criminal Code. This provision makes hardcore collusion a crime punishable by 5 to 10 years in prison for individuals who enter, order or execute a cartel agreement

Fines under the Criminal Code can also be imposed (ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 times the UMA) but the prison term is the more consequential aspect. As it has been mentioned, criminal enforcement in Mexico requires a separate process: COFECE must formally refer the case to the FGR (Attorney General) after it has sufficient evidence (usually around the time it issues the Statement of Probable Responsibility)

The FGR then conducts its own investigation and prosecution in the criminal courts. Because of this two-track system, criminal sanctions have been extremely rare. In fact, since criminalization was introduced in 2011, COFECE has only referred to two cases (both bid-rigging in public health sector tenders) for criminal prosecution and none has yet resulted in a completed criminal verdict.

This shows that while the threat of imprisonment is in books (and can be a deterrent in theory), enforcement has primarily been via administrative fines. One reason is that up until 2014, a final COFECE decision was required before pressing charges, causing delay, that requirement was removed to expedite criminal cases, but the FGR still faces challenges like lack of specialized competition prosecutors.

In addition, it is important to mention that as part of the amendments to competition law subject to the ongoing reform process, there is the high possibility of fines to increase. Early drafts of the bill suggest that the fines for cartels may amount up to 20% of the undertaking’s income.

Footnote(s):

¹ 1 UMA in 2025 is equal to $113.14MXN or approximately $5.52USD.

The Commission issues detailed calculations in its decisions, however, clear criteria to calculate and impose fines are yet to be issued by The Commission. Nevertheless, COFECE considers the gravity of the offence, size of the market, the profits earned from the cartel (if estimable), and each offender’s financial capacity.

Some aggravating factors include being the cartel ringleader, coercing other firms to participate, or obstructing the investigation. Mitigating factors can include if the firm ceased the infringement when the investigation started, if it cooperated beyond legal requirements (outside leniency, e.g. promptly complying with requests), or if it has an effective compliance programme (though mere existence of a compliance programme, if it failed to prevent the cartel, usually doesn’t reduce the fine; it might help avoid debarment in procurement contexts, however).

Currently, having a compliance programme is not formally recognized as a factor that reduces fines under the FECL, but COFECE has occasionally noted it as positive context. What clearly impacts fines is leniency: an immunity recipient gets no fine, and reduction applicants get the percentage off as agreed (50%, 30%, etc.).

In terms of magnitude, COFECE’s fines for cartels have at times reached substantial levels, though still generally lower than EU or US fines in absolute terms. The highest cartel fine on record by COFECE was MXN 1.1 billion (around US$54 million) imposed in 2017 on a group of financial institutions engaged in a pension fund cartel

Other notable fines include about MXN 580 million in total against several global shipping companies for a car-carrier shipping cartel, and MXN 437 million in 2024 against a network of gasoline retailers who fixed fuel prices.

Finally, it is worth noting that any collected fines do not go to COFECE’s budget, they go to the federal treasury, so COFECE has no direct financial incentive to levy higher fines.

A question often arising in international contexts is whether parent companies are liable for cartel conduct of their subsidiaries. In Mexico, there is no explicit doctrine of “single economic entity” or automatic parental liability as in the EU. COFECE’s practice is to sanction the legal entities directly involved in the cartel.

Typically, these will be the operating companies that participated (e.g. the Mexican subsidiaries or local business units that fixed prices). If a parent company in Mexico directly colluded (through its officers), it could be named as an economic agent and fined. Moreover, the FECL’s definition of “economic agent” is broad – it encompasses corporations, groups of persons, or any entity that conducts economic activities.

This means COFECE could treat a corporate group as one economic agent in theory. However, in practice, COFECE must fine the specific company that engaged in the conduct and does not automatically extend liability to parent companies unless evidence shows the parent exercised control over or was complicit in the collusion.

There is not a formal joint liability regime making a parent pay the fine of its subsidiary by default. If multiple related entities in a conglomerate each played a role (say manufacturing arm and distribution arm both agreed to a scheme), COFECE might sanction each. But a purely holding company that was not involved would not be fined just because it owns the offender.

On the other hand, if COFECE finds that the collusion was effectively directed by the corporate group’s central management, they might name the parent as a party. Mexican competition law does not mirror the EU approach where parent companies can be fined for their subsidiaries’ acts based on presumption of control – any such liability in Mexico would require demonstrating the parent’s involvement, and while COFECE can’t simply reach into a foreign parent’s deep pockets without cause, it will not hesitate to fine all domestic affiliates that took part in a cartel.

There are no private antitrust claims in Mexico. In Mexico, a person can only claim damages before specialized antitrust courts once all legal procedures to challenge the antitrust authorities’ final resolution have been exhausted.

On the other hand, Mexico introduced class action mechanisms in 2012, and competition law infringements were included as a ground for class actions. Under the Federal Code of Civil Procedure, COFECE itself, or the federal consumer protection agency (PROFECO), or a group of at least 30 affected consumers, can initiate a collective action on behalf of consumers injured by a cartel. In fact, COFECE for the first time in its history filed a class action in 2022 on behalf of consumers against a cartel. It is important to highlight that damages can only be claimed once a resolution becomes unappealable.

Mexican law allows successful plaintiffs to recover actual damages (loss or impairment suffered in one’s assets due to the failure to fulfil an obligation) and lost profits caused by the cartel. This may include the overcharge paid (the difference between the price actually paid and what the competitive price would have been absent the cartel), or any consequential losses (for example, if a company lost sales because it had to pass on high input costs to its customers, those lost profits could be claimed).

Notably, punitive or treble damages are not available under current Mexican law, but, the Mexican Supreme Court has ruled in cases regarding non-material damages, that the defendant may be ordered to pay punitive damages. Taking into consideration the above, there is a possibility that economic agents that have participated in a cartel may be ordered to pay punitive damages.

Quantifying damages in cartel cases can be complex, typically requiring expert economic evidence to establish the bug-for price and the volume of commerce affected. Courts will rely heavily on the content of COFECE’s decision (which might detail price effects or harm in qualitative terms), but the plaintiff still must prove the amount of harm suffered.

Companies and individuals penalized by COFECE have the right to appeal to the agency’s final decision, and in practice all cartel decisions are challenged. The appeal mechanism is via the amparo trial, which is Mexico’s form of judicial review of administrative action.

An addressee of a COFECE decision can appeal on both procedural and substantive grounds– effectively a full merits and legality review.

Typical grounds include: lack of due process (for instance, if the defendant was not properly notified or given access to the file), insufficient evidence or incorrect assessment of facts (arguing that COFECE did not meet the burden of proof to establish a cartel agreement or participation of the appellant), misapplication of law (e.g. claiming the conduct was not actually a per se violation or fell under an exemption), or disproportionality of the fine.

The courts can review whether the fine was calculated in accordance with the law and guidelines, and sometimes fines have been adjusted on appeal. However, appeals do not re-try the whole case with new evidence; the review is based on the record from COFECE’s proceedings, examining whether the decision was constitutional, lawful and reasonably supported by evidence.

Under the current FECL, COFECE’s decisions cannot be appealed to any administrative superior (there is no higher competition authority). Instead, the only route is an indirect amparo lawsuit before the specialized competition courts

These are federal courts (district courts) that specialize in economic competition, broadcasting and telecom matters, providing expertise in these complex cases. An amparo in this context is akin to a combined appeal on the merits and a constitutional review. The appellant can challenge the entirety of COFECE’s resolution (liability finding and sanctions).

In cartel cases, appellants often argue that COFECE did not sufficiently prove the existence of an agreement or their involvement in it – disputing the merits. They may also argue that the behaviour was not intended to restrict competition or had no effect (though lack of effect is not a legal defence, sometimes it is used to persuade judges that COFECE overreached). Another ground could be that certain evidence was obtained illegally (for example, if they allege a raid was conducted without following legal formalities, they might seek to nullify that evidence).

Once a resolution or statement is notified, the appealing party has a maximum of 15 business days to file the amparo lawsuit against COFECE or IFT as the respondent authorities, before an antitrust specialised court.

Once the lawsuit is filed, the sanctions imposed by the competition authorities (such as fines) need not to be paid until the appeal is resolved.

The amparo court examines the case and will issue a judgment which can: uphold COFECE’s decision, or annul it in whole or part, or occasionally modify it (for instance, confirming the violation but adjusting the fine).

Often, if the court finds fault with COFECE’s reasoning or procedure, it will annul the decision and send it back to COFECE for re-determination consistent with the court’s findings. Sometimes only the fine is recalculated on court order, if the liability is upheld but the sanction deemed improper. Both the petitioner (company) and COFECE can appeal the district court’s amparo ruling to a Collegiate Circuit Court (an appellate panel) for review (this is called an ‘amparo en revisión’). A case could even reach the Supreme Court if novel constitutional issues arise, though that is uncommon in routine cartel appeals.

Once appeals are exhausted, COFECE’s decision (as upheld or modified by the judiciary), becomes final, which, as mentioned. Is needed for damages suits.

As a side note, it is worth mentioning that recent attempts have been made to challenge dawn raids through amparo trials before the Commission issues a resolution—a practice expressly prohibited by both the Constitution and the FECL. However, no challenge of this nature has been successful so far.

Last year, COFECE imposed significant fines in two major cartel cases involving price manipulation in the gasoline and waterproofing materials markets.

In the first case, 52 gas stations, the Mexican Association of Gasoline Entrepreneurs (Amegas), and 18 executives were fined over 437 million pesos for conspiring to manipulate gasoline prices between 2014 and 2021. Various gas station groups coordinated price-setting practices, with the highest fine exceeding 315 million pesos for activities in Mérida, Yucatán. Other violations occurred in Guanajuato, Chiapas, León, and Hidalgo, affecting consumers nationwide.

The second case involved two leading waterproofing companies, Grupo Thermotek and Impac, along with five executives, fined with more than 237 million pesos for colluding over nine years (2008-2017) to manipulate prices nationwide. Executives involved were also disqualified from holding managerial positions in the industry for up to five years.

In 2022, COFECE published its strategic plan for 2022 to 2025, where the authority outlined the sectors to prioritise during this period. To identify these sectors, COFECE analysed their contribution to economic growth, widespread consumption, cross-cutting impact, effect on low-income populations, regulated sectors, prevalence of anticompetitive behaviours and international trends.

As a result, the outlined sectors included food and beverage, transportation and logistics, the financial sector, construction and real estate services, energy, health, public procurement and digital markets.

In recent years, however, investigations into cartel practices have targeted various sectors, including pharmaceuticals, fuel (both ground and maritime), passenger and freight transportation, tortillas (a staple food in Mexico), waterproofing products, public procurement bids and the financial and banking sector, such as the administration of retirement funds, government bonds and services associated to transactions made with credit cards in the form of interest-free monthly instalments.

Additionally, as mentioned previously, dawn raids have been the most important investigative tool for the Commission. During their development, the COFECE has obtained valuable evidence to support the probable existence of absolute monopolistic practices in several investigations.

Over the past several years, email evidence has proven to be the most useful source to detect the existence of cartels, to determine how the cartel operates and who are the main participants.

Recently, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice ruled that emails sent or received by economic agents regarding their commercial activity are not private communications, which reinforces the use of emails or other means of communication as evidence to prove the existence of cartels.

Also, in the exercise of dawn raids, the Commission has obtained documents protected by attorney–client privilege triggering the need to have specific processes to manage and deal with privileged information. The federal courts have determined that the Commission does not have the authority to obtain these communications, thus, COFECE has enacted specific Regulatory Provisions as well as technical procedure to manage privileged information.

Last year, several constitutional amendments were made to eliminate most autonomous bodies, including COFECE and IFT, transferring their functions to government entities. Under the amendment, COFECE and IFT will be dissolved, and their powers will be transferred to a newly created authority on economic competition. This new body will have its own legal personality and assets, along with technical and operational independence in decision-making, organization and operations.

The new agency will also presumably guarantee a separation between the authority responsible for investigations and the one issuing resolutions. Additionally, it will assume the economic competition functions of the IFT, which will retain only its role of imposing asymmetric regulations in the telecommunications and broadcasting markets to eliminate barriers to competition and limit regional or national concentration of frequencies, concessions and cross-ownership.

Notably, the amendment does not clarify the legal nature of the institution that will replace COFECE. Both President Claudia Sheinbaum and members of her party have explicitly stated that the functions of this new agency are likely to be transferred to a decentralized body under the Ministry of Economy.

Currently, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the future of the authority, particularly in terms of how anticompetitive behaviour will be described, configured and sanctioned under the new competition law. A new law on economic competition is expected to be issued soon, but the exact details of its implementation remain unclear.

There is no fixed date for the dissolution of these autonomous bodies. According to the transitory provisions of the amendment, COFECE and IFT will be extinguished 180 days after the enactment of new secondary legislation on economic competition and telecommunications, to be issued by the Mexican Congress. However, there is no deadline for Congress to pass this legislation, meaning that both agencies will continue operating during this transition period without a clear timeline for their termination.

To date, however, the necessary secondary law has not been passed – nor even formally debated – in the Mexican Congress.

In fact, a draft bill to establish the new competition regime (creating a Comisión Nacional Antimonopolios to replace COFECE and IFTs competition functions) was briefly posted for public consultation in March 2025 but was abruptly removed hours later and it has not yet been submitted to the legislature for discussion.

Compounding these challenges, at the beginning of 2025, Congress announced a significant budget reduction for both COFECE and IFT. This budget cut is expected to impact on the scope of their operations, forcing them to focus on investigations and mergers within specific essential sectors rather than adopting a comprehensive approach to the entire market. Additionally, the budget cuts will reduce staffing levels, increasing the workload for the remaining personnel and potentially affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of these agencies’ operations.

Given the uncertainty surrounding the future of the regulatory framework and the new institutional setup, there is likely to be a shift in priorities, and businesses may need to closely monitor developments to adjust their strategies accordingly.