In South Korea, criminal law regulates bribery and corruption. The Criminal Code provides the framework for prohibiting bribery and corruption, including those involving public officials as well as among private individuals. The Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes (the “Specific Crimes Act”) and the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes (the “Specific Economic Crimes Act”) set out specific penalty provisions. The Criminal Procedure Act outlines the procedures for investigation and prosecution of bribery and corruption.

The criminal laws of South Korea apply to:

1. Anyone, including Korean nationals and foreign nationals, who commit a crime within the territory of South Korea (Article 2 of the Criminal Code). This includes cases where any part of the criminal act takes place in South Korea or its effects are felt within South Korea;
2. all Korean nationals who commit a crime outside the territory of South Korea (Article 3 of the Criminal Code); and
3. foreign nationals who commit crimes outside the territory of South Korea against South Korea or its nationals. However, the criminal law of South Korea will not apply if the act does not constitute a crime or if prosecution or execution of the sentence is exempted under the law of the place where it was committed. (Article 6 of the Criminal Code).

Specific legislations targeting bribery and corruption include the (i) Code of Conduct for Public Officials of Korea (“CoC”), (ii) Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (“ACRC Act”), (iii) Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions Act (“FBPA”), and (iv) Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (the “Graft Act”), also known as the “Kim Young-ran Act.”

To encourage the reporting of bribery and corruption, the Korean government passed the Protection of Public Interest Reporters Act in 2011. This act safeguards whistle-blowers who report activities that harm public health and safety, the environment, consumers, and fair trade practices.

Public Prosecution: Prosecutors have broad prosecutorial discretion to investigate and prosecute bribery and corruption.

1. Article 196 of the Criminal Procedure Act allows a prosecutor to initiate investigation upon suspicion that an offense has been committed.
2. However, under Article 247 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a prosecutor may decide not to institute a prosecution even if a prosecutor believes an offense has been committed as a result of his/her investigation, considering various factors, such as the offender’s age, character and conduct, intelligence, environment, relation to the victim, motive for the commission of the crime, the means and the results of the crime and circumstances after the commission of the crime.
3. The Special Investigation Department within each of the prosecutor’s office has bribery and corruption as enforcement priority.

National Policy Agency (“Police”): The Police can also investigate crimes but does not have authority to prosecute.

Bureau of Audit and Inspection (“BAI”): BAI is an agency under the executive branch of the government that is responsible for auditing accounts of the state agencies and the duties of administrative agencies and public officials. Under the ACRC Act, BAI has the authority to conduct an audit when there is a report filed by a member of the public regarding the violation of the Graft Act. Further, public officials must report to the BAI or relevant investigative agencies/commission, if they become aware of other public officials’ corrupt activities or if they are forced or offered to engage in corrupt activities. BAI will investigate these reports. Based on the results of the investigation, BAI may discipline the offending public official or refer the matter to the relevant agency if criminal charges are suspected.

Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (“ACRC”): Anyone who becomes aware of violations of the Graft Act, corrupt activities, or violations of the CoC may report them to the ACRC.

1. Upon receiving reports, ACRC verifies basic information about the reporter, the circumstances of the report, and its purpose. It may request the submission of documents that are necessary to verify the authenticity of the reported information.
2. If ACRC deems an audit, investigation, or inquiry to be necessary with respect to the reported matters, it must refer them to BAI, or the relevant agency depending on the nature of the offense.
3. If the report involves matters requiring investigation/prosecution of a high-ranking public official, ACRC must file a complaint with the prosecutors or the relevant agency depending on the nature of the offense.

Other Administrative Agencies: For investigation of violations of anti-corruption law in certain specific industries such as the pharmaceutical industry, the prosecution may also form a joint task force with the relevant administrative agencies (e.g. the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety).

See also our responses to Question 17 regarding the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials.

Bribery: The Criminal Code does not explicitly define the term “bribery” but treats the act of receiving a bribe and the act of offering a bribe differently (Articles 129-133 of the Criminal Code).

1. The act of receiving a bribe broadly includes (i) receiving bribes in connection with the person’s duties, (ii) where the public official or the arbitrator demands or promises a bribe, and (iii) where the bribe is offered, demanded or promised to a related third party/intermediary. While the timing of the bribe is not important, the “bribery” described above after engaging in corrupt activities is also prohibited.
2. The act of offering a bribe includes instances where a person makes a statement of intent to offer a bribe, promises to offer a bribe, and provides a bribe in the manner described above (from (i) to (iii)).

The Graft Act sets out the specific thresholds that qualifies as bribery for a domestic public official.

1. It is a criminal offence for a domestic public official to receive an amount exceeding: (i) KRW 1 million (approximately US$700) or its equivalent at one time; or (ii) KRW 3 million (approximately US$2,100) or its equivalent per annum, regardless of whether there is a link to their duties. (Article 8(1) of the Graft Act)
2. Domestic public officials are prohibited from accepting, requesting, or promising to accept cash or benefits in connection with their duties at all (without a threshold). (Article 8(2) of the Graft Act). Improper solicitation of a domestic public official’s influence is prohibited irrespective of whether there is any benefit offered or received in connection with it. (Article 5 of the Graft Act)
3. The CoC contains similar provisions as above. However, the monetary thresholds for exceptions are to be determined by the relevant government authority of the public official. Under the CoC, only domestic public officials who receive a bribe (and not the bribe giver) could be subject to disciplinary action.

The Graft Act provides for certain exceptions to the prohibition of the receipt of money or valuables (Presidential Decree Article 17, Appended Table 1), such as:

1. for food and drink, KRW 30,000 (approximately US$21).
2. for funerals and weddings, KRW 50,000 (approximately US$36), except in case of condolence and congratulatory flowers, up to KRW 100,000 (approximately US$72).
3. for gifts (excluding agricultural products or processed goods with more than 50% of agricultural or fisheries content), KRW 50,000 (approximately US$36).
4. gifts that are agricultural products or processed goods with more than 50% of agricultural or fisheries content, KRW 150,000 (approximately US$100), temporarily relaxed to KRW 300,000 (approximately US$200) before and after recent Korean traditional holidays

There are some specific business sector regulations allowing giving or accepting benefits under certain conditions, including pharmaceutical and healthcare (Pharmaceutical Affairs Act and Medical Devices Act), insurance (Insurance Business Act), financial investment (Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act) and defence (Code of Conduct of the Acquisition Program Administration).

Corruption: Article 2(4) of the ACRC Act defines the “act of corruption” as follows:

1. The act of any public official’s abusing his or her position or authority or violating statutes or regulations in connection with his or her duties to seek gains for himself or herself or any third party;
2. The act of inflicting damages on the property of any public institution in violation of statutes or regulations, in the process of executing the budget of the relevant public institution, acquiring, managing, or disposing of the property of the relevant public institution, or entering into and executing a contract to which the relevant public institution is a party;
3. The act of coercing, urging, proposing and inducing any act under items (a) and (b) or act of covering it up (emphasis added).

Korean law draws a distinction between bribery of a public official and bribery of private persons. In principle, the difference between private sector bribery and public sector bribery is the requirement of proof of an “improper request”: whereas the “improper request” is required to establish a crime of bribery in the private sector (e.g., a request to award a bid in exchange for cash), this is not necessarily required for public sector bribery as long as the economic benefits are connected to the public official’s duties (under the Criminal Code) or above a certain threshold amount (under the Graft Act).

Definition of Public Official: In Korea, public officials include persons defined in various statutes to cover individual performing a certain public function delegated by a state or local government. The statutes define a public official as follows:

1. The State Public Officials Act and Local Public Officials Act: any person employed by a state or local government.
2. The Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes: any senior staff employee of a “state-owned” or “state-controlled” entity, which is listed in the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes.
3. The Act on Administration of Public Entities: any director, officer or employee of a ”public corporation” and “quasi-government entity” is deemed to be a public official. A list of the public corporations and quasi-government entities is updated and issued annually by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance.

Economic Benefit: As noted above, establishing the bribery of a public official does not require showing of an improper request. In establishing bribery to the public official, it is sufficient that an economic benefit received by a public official is in connection with such public official’s duties.

1. Courts have ruled that “an economic benefit received is in connection with a public official’s duties” not only includes the legal duties of the public official, but also the de facto duties of the official as well as the duties of the department to which the public official belongs. However, if giving a gift or other economic benefit under the circumstances is consistent with a social custom or courtesy or if a benefit is given because of a personal relationship between the public official and the giver, such benefit is deemed not to be in connection with the public official’s duties.
2. The Specific Economic Crimes Act also expressly prohibits the giving, offering and promising of unlawful economic benefit to, and soliciting of, accepting of or promising to accept such unlawful economic benefit by the employees of financial institutions. It does not require that an improper request be made.

Foreign public officials: Under the Foreign Bribery Act, a “foreign public official” includes: (i) a person who provides a legislative, administrative or judiciary service for a foreign government; (ii) a person to whom a business of a foreign government was delegated; (iii) a person who works for a public statutory institution/organisation; (iv) a person who works for a corporation in which the investment made by a foreign government accounts for more than 50% of the paid-in capital, or which is controlled by a foreign government; and (v) a person who works for a public international organisation.

Hence, the acts of giving, offering or promising a benefit to a foreign public official for the purposes of obtaining an improper benefit in connection with international commercial transactions are prohibited. In other words, the laws of South Korea do not strictly distinguish between domestic and foreign public officials. Indeed, different statutes set out penalties for bribery and corruption without distinguishing foreign officials from domestic officials.

In principle, individuals can only be held liable for bribery where there are applicable sentencing provisions to the circumstances that gave rise to the bribery.

1. Directors and officers of a corporation are not automatically held responsible for bribery committed by their employees. However, if they consented to or approved the employees’ corrupt actions, they may be liable for conspiracy to commit bribery.
2. However, the FBPA and certain industry statutes (e.g. the Medical Devices Act, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, the Framework Act on the Construction Industry and the Housing Act) expressly provide for vicarious liability of a corporation. See e.g., Article 4 of the FBPA. Under these statutes, a corporation can be held criminally liable for bribery committed by its agent or employee. However, a corporation will not be found liable for the actions of its employees if the corporation can demonstrate that it discharged its duty to adequately supervise those employees.

According to Article 14(1)of the Specific Economic Crimes Act, if an officer or employee of a financial company is convicted of a bribery, he or she will be prohibited from working for a certain period at (i) any financial company, (ii) any institution capitalized wholly or partially by the State or a local government, (iii) any institution which receives any contribution or assistance from the State or a local government, and (iv) any enterprise that is closely related to the convicted offense.

In addition, Article 14(2) of the Specific Economic Crimes Act provides that the above offender and the enterprise in which the offender acts as a representative or executive may not obtain any license, registration or authorization in connection with government-licensed businesses during a certain period of time.

Separately, under specific business sector regulations that restrict giving or accepting benefits, the relevant individual and/or business operator may be subject to license revocation or suspension. For example, under the Medical Devices Act, the relevant authorities may revoke license to manufacture, import or sale if the manufacturer, importer or distributor has committed illegal rebates to the healthcare professionals (Article 36(1)(10) of the Medical Devices Act).

The criminal consequences vary upon the type of the bribery and corruption offences.

a. Violation of the domestic public official bribery offence under the Criminal Code:

• A recipient of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment (Article 129(1) of the Criminal Code).
• A recipient of a bribe may face an aggravated penalty of five years’ imprisonment or more to life imprisonment if the amount received is KRW 30 million or more (approximately US$21,700), depending on the exact amount of the bribe (Article 2(1) of the Specific Crimes Act).
• Also, under Article 2(2) the Specific Crimes Act, an additional fine of 2 to 5 times the amount of the bribe could be imposed, regardless of the amount of the bribe.
• A giver of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW 20 million (approximately US$14,500) (Article 133(1) of the Criminal Code).

b. Violation of the domestic private commercial bribery offence under the Criminal Code:

• A recipient of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW 10 million (approximately US$7,200) (Article 357(1) of the Criminal Code).
• A giver of a bribe may face up to two years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW 5 million (approximately US$3,600) (Article 357(2) of the Criminal Code).

c. Violation of the foreign public official bribery offence under the FBPA:

• A giver of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine up to KRW 50 million (approximately US$36,300) where the benefit gained from the bribe is KRW 10 million or less (approximately US$7,200) (Article 3(1) of the FBPA).
• A giver of a bribe may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine up to twice the value of the benefit where the benefit gained from the bribe exceeds KRW 10 million (approximately US$7,200) (Article 3(1) of the FBPA).
• A corporation may face a fine of up to KRW 1 billion (approximately US$726,500) if it is found liable for its employee’s violation of the FBPA and the benefit gained from the bribe is KRW 500 million or less (approximately US$363,200) (Article 4 of the FBPA).
• A corporation may face a fine of up twice the value of the benefit if it is found liable for its employee’s violation of the FBPA and the benefit gained from the bribe is more than KRW 500 million (approximately US$363,200) (Article 4 of the FBPA).

Deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements are not available in South Korea. Whether to prosecute the defendant or not falls upon the prosecutors’ discretion, and there is no statutory mechanism to allow negotiation or consultation with the defendant regarding whether to prosecute the defendant.

In general, Korean law does not distinguish expenditure on gifts and hospitality from bribes. However, the Graft Act and the CoC provide certain exceptions that are not deemed to be bribes, which include:

1. transportation, accommodation and meals which are provided by the host of official events to all of its attendees, provided that such event is related to the recipient’s official duties;
2. items of value provided by relatives;
3. promotional items or souvenirs that are distributed to numerous and unspecified persons;
4. cash and valuables provided in order to aid a public official who is in under a financial strain due to a disease or a disaster; and
5. otherwise such gifts/hospitality within socially acceptable boundaries.

See also our responses to Question 3 under the definition of bribery.

The Political Funds Act regulates donations of political funds in South Korea (Article 2 of the Political Funds Act). Except for the membership fees paid by a party member to his or her political party, in principle, support for a particular political party or politician can only be made through a support association. The Political Fund Act strictly regulates registration of a support association, the limit on the amount of donations, and the method of collecting funds (Articles 6 to 21 of the Political Fund Act).

Further, the Political Funds Act limits persons who can donate political contributions to domestic individuals. Accordingly, a foreigner, domestic corporations/organizations, and foreign corporations /organizations cannot make political contributions. It also prohibits making political contributions with funds related to domestic corporations/organizations, and foreign corporations/organizations (Article 31 of the Political Funds Act). With respect to the election of public officials, political funds may not be donated or received for specific acts, including recommending a specific person as a candidate, and no person may arrange donations by coercing against other person’s will by using work/employment or other relationships (Articles 32 and 33 of the Political Funds Act).

A person who donates or receives political funds in a manner not prescribed by the Political Funds Act may face up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding KRW 10 million (approximately US$7,200) (see Article 45 of the Political Funds Act).

South Korean laws do not expressly regulate “facilitation payments.” Hence, the payment will be considered a bribe if elements of finding a bribe are present in the circumstances. However, the FBPA exempts authorized payments under the law of the foreign official’s country from being considered a bribe. Therefore, if the facilitation payment is allowed in the foreign official’s country, such payment will not be subject to the FBPA.

There is no defence that is expressly provided for under a statute of South Korea.

The sentencing standards for bribery-related offenses do not explicitly state that implementation of a compliance program within a company as a mitigation factor. South Korea has established a sentencing committee under the umbrella of the Supreme Court, which provides sentencing standards that reflect the characteristics of each crime. These sentencing standards are not binding in principle, but if a judge deviates from the sentencing standards, the reasons for sentencing must be stated in the judgment.

There were instances where the courts considered the existence of a compliance program in connection with determining the sentence. In a recent indictment of the head of the large conglomerate for offering bribes to the President of South Korea, the court held that the fact that the head of the large conglomerate strengthened the compliance monitoring system after the incident should be regarded a “post-offense circumstance”, which is one of the factors that should be taken into consideration when determining the sentence under Article 51(4) of the Criminal Code. Further, the court noted that for a compliance program to be considered as one of the factors in determining a sentence, the effectiveness of the program needs to be strictly verified. In this case, the court held that the compliance program was not proven to be effective, and therefore could not serve as a mitigating factor.

In order to provide guidance on the permitted and prohibited acts related to the Graft Act, the Graft Law commentary, the major rulings and decisions concerning the Graft Act, manuals, administrative rulings are published and regularly updated in the ACRC website.

Some examples of the guidelines are as follows:

1. Commentary (2024):https://www.clean.go.kr/board.es?mid=a10420020200&bid=128
2. Manual (2022):https://www.clean.go.kr/board.es?mid=a10420020200&bid=128
3. Summary of Key decisions (2023): https://www.clean.go.kr/board.es?mid=a10420020200&bid=128
4. Key cases (2022): https://www.clean.go.kr/board.es?mid=a10420020200&bid=128

There is a separate law on whistle-blowers (the Public Interest Whistleblower Protection Act), which does not apply to bribery and corruption. The protection and incentivization of the whistle-blowers in the context of bribery and corruption are included in the ACRC Act and Graft Act.

ACRC Act contains the following provisions to protect the whistle-blowers.

1. Protection Measures: A reporting person may seek protection by filing an application with the ACRC.
   1. A person who reports an issue and experiences or expects to experience any adverse action can request the ACRC to take the necessary steps to reinstate or protect them from such actions. This includes reinstating or maintaining a license, permit, contract, employment position (Article 62-2 of the ACRC Act).
   2. If a reporting person requests reinstatement or protection, it is assumed that they have experienced adverse action (Article 63 of the ACRC Act).
   3. If necessary, the ACRC can instruct the police to implement protective measures such as providing security guards, escorts, protective custody, surveillance, and other similar actions to protect the whistle-blower (Article 64-2 of the ACRC Act).
2. Exemption and Reduction: If the report results in the discovery of the reporting person’s own criminal activity, they may request an exemption from or reduction of the penalties that would normally be imposed on them (Article 66 of the ACRC Act).
3. Confidentiality: Disclosing the personal identification details of a reporting person, or any information that could reveal their identity, is prohibited (Article 64(1) of the ACRC Act). Violating this provision can result in five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW 50 million (approximately US$7,200) (Article 88 of the ACRC Act).
4. Prohibition of Adverse Action: Taking any action that causes personal, administrative, or economic harm to a reporting person is prohibited (Article 62(1) of the ACRC Act). Violating this provision can result in three years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW 30 million (approximately US$7,200) (Article 90 of the ACRC Act).

Note that there are similar provision under Graft Act to protect the whistle-blowers.

ACRC Act and Graft Act contain nearly identical provisions to incentivise the whistle-blowers as follows.

1. Compensation: A reporting person can request compensation from the ACRC of up to KRW 3 billion (approximately US$2,179,200) if their report directly leads to income recovery, increased revenue, or reduced expenses for a public institution, or if it provides the necessary facts to achieve such results. (Article 68(2) of the ACRC Act; Article 15(6) of the Graft Act).
2. Financial Reward: If reporting results in significant financial benefit or prevents financial loss to a public institution, or if it otherwise promotes any public interest, the ACRC may provide a reward (or recommend a reward) to the reporting person up to KRW 500 million (approximately US$363,000) (Article 68(1) of the ACRC Act; Article 15(5) of the Graft Act).
3. Relief Money: The ACRC may provide relief money to reporting individuals, their relatives, cohabitants, or those who have assisted in related audits or investigations. This assistance covers various expenses or damages incurred due to the report, including (i) costs for physical or mental treatment; (ii) moving expenses related to office transfer or dispatched service; (iii) legal procedure expenses for litigation filed based on the report; and (iv) compensation for wage loss during a period of disadvantageous measures (Article 68(3) of the ACRC Act; Article 15(7) of the Graft Act).

Korean investigative and enforcement agencies are taking a firm stance against bribery. Due to the clandestine nature of bribery, it is challenging to identify investigation leads in many instances. To address this issue, the Korean government is seeking to foster a safe environment where individuals are able to actively file reports and lodge complaints. After investigation leads are secured, there is a high rate of indictment, and upon finding of bribery and corruption, courts impose significant sentences for such offenses.

According to the crime analysis statistics published by the Prosecutor’s Office, the investigation leads for bribery (both receiving and offering) of public officials are often based on reports filed as complaints and accusations, but there is also a significant portion based on the investigation agency’s inquiries as well as learning through other crime investigations. According to the Prosecutor’s Office, Crime Analysis Statistics 2022, out of the total number of bribery crimes in which public officials are offenders in 2020, the number of reported cases is about 52% and the number of cases based on the inquiries and other crime investigation is about 22%. As for 2021, the number of reported cases out of the total number of bribery crimes is about 30%, and the number of reported cases based on the inquiries and other crime investigation is about 35%. In 2022, out of the total number of bribery crimes, approximately 49% are reported and about 15% are based on the inquiries and other crime investigation.

The statistics on the results of the dispositions of public officials shows a significantly higher rate of indictment for bribery (both receiving and giving) compared to the overall rate of the indictment of the public official offenders. There was an indictment of bribery crimes at about 47% in 2020, 30% in 2021, and 35% in 2022. This is significantly higher than the indictment rate of all crimes committed by public officials, which is approximately 24% in 2020, 21% in 2021, 23% in 2022.

In Korea, there has been an ongoing discussion surrounding the need for an independent agency to oversee the prosecutors’ exercise of exclusive rights to prosecute and to prevent corruption and abuse of power associated with high-ranking authorities. After several rounds of debates, the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (“Corruption Investigation Office”) was established in early 2020.

The Corruption Investigation Office has the authority to investigate the crimes allegedly committed by high-ranking public officials (including, the President, members of the National Assembly, members of the judiciary, prosecutors, certain public officials in political service, head of a local government, superintendent of education, police officers above the rank of the superintendent, and  military officers of general rank or higher) as well as persons who held the above positions within the last three years. The Corruption Investigation Office may also investigate family members of high-ranking public officials, and in the case of the President, the investigations can extend up to the President’s first cousins. The Corruption Investigation Office holds the right to initiate prosecution and maintain prosecution with respect to the high-ranking public officials.

The offenses that are the subject of investigation by the Corruption Investigation Office are limited to offenses that were designed to be addressed by the Corruption Investigation Office when it was established, including corruption crimes such as bribery.

Notably, the Corruption Investigation Office investigated and indicted the former Chief Prosecutor for bribery in 2021 and a high-ranking police officer for bribery and violation of the Graft Act in 2024.

Decisions made by administrative authorities can be contested through an administrative pre-litigation appeal or administrative litigation. An interested party has the following options to file an administrative pre-litigation appeal:

1. Administrative review by the head of relevant government authority;
2. Administrative review by the BAI.

Under Article 68(2) of the ACRC Act, a person who reports corrupt activities to a public institution, which leads to income recovery, increased revenue, or reduced expenses for the public institution, can apply for a reward for their report. If the report was filed by a public official as part of their duties, the remuneration may be reduced or denied. Recently, the ACRC Act was amended to clarify that these restrictions also apply to former public officials who reported issues related to their duties while they were employed (Article 68(4) of the ACRC Act).

Recently, there have been significant developments to enhance control over bribery and corrupt activities, including (i) amendments to the ACRC Act, strengthening of the functions of the ACRC, (ii) the enactment and amendment of the Graft Act (see our responses for Question 23), and (iv) the establishment of the Corruption Investigation Office (see our responses for Question 17). At present, as these changes are being implemented and put into practice, there are no specific discussions regarding the reform or development of bribery and anti-corruption laws.

South Korea is a party to (i) United Nations Convention against Corruption (UN Anti-Corruption Convention), (ii) OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention), and (iii) Member of the Financial Action Task Force.

South Korea does not recognize legal privilege between attorneys and clients. The Attorney-at-Law Act only imposes a duty of confidentiality to attorneys, which states that “no confidential information obtained in the course of performing his/her duties shall be disclosed.” The Act does not protect attorney-client communications or work products against investigative agencies’ investigation, search and confiscation of the materials. As a result, there were several instances where attorneys’ offices were subject to search and seizure by investigative agencies. The Korean Bar Association is raising concerns about the lack of protection over attorney-client communications and work products. As such, an amendment to the Attorney-at-Law Act was submitted to the National Assembly in 2022 to allow attorneys protect their client’s confidential information, but the amendment has not been passed.

Recently, in a case where a company filed a quasi-appeal procedure seeking cancellation of the seizure of communications between the attorney and the client, which the company had kept in electronic form and have been seized during the prosecutor’s search, the court of lower instance cancelled the seizure on the basis of the need to protect the right to receive assistance from an attorney under the Constitution. It will be worth monitoring whether the above decision will be upheld in future cases to establish a series of precedent on these matters.

Korea enacted the Anti-Corruption Act in 2001, which came to effect in 2002, to prevent corruption in the public institutions. Since the enactment, Korean government has been exerting various efforts to strengthen regulations on anti-bribery and corruption activities.

1. In accordance with the Anti-Corruption Act, an Anti-Corruption Commission was formed in 2002 under the executive branch, to improve laws, systems, and other related measures necessary for anti-bribery and anti-corruption activities.
2. Subsequently, in 2008, the Anti-Corruption Act was integrated with the Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, which regulated matters in connection with the protection of rights and interests of the people. Since then, the functions held by the Anti-Corruption Commission was merged with the ACRC.
3. In 2016, the Graft Act was enacted with the intention of continuing its efforts to eradicate corruption. The Graft Act prohibits illegal solicitation and provision of money or valuables to public officials, among others, and allows sanctions to be imposed if the public officials’ receipt of money or valuables activities exceed a certain limit, even if they are not related to their duties or are not considered as consideration.
4. During the G20 Seoul Meeting, Korea urged that G20 Member States should accede to and ratify major international anti-corruption agreements, such as the UN Anti-Corruption Convention and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and adopted the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan.

Despite the above efforts and Korea’s participation in anti-corruption activities in the international community such as OECD, UN, and G20, it appears that Korea is not fully recognized in various international corruption assessments.

The current government expressed its position to further ACRC’s efforts and strictly penalize corruption. The continuing efforts made by the government and enhanced compliance culture throughout the Korean society is believed to lead to better acknowledgment of Korean anti-bribery and corruption activities in the future.

According to the bribery risk assessment issued by TRACE International Inc., a non-profit business organization dedicated to promoting ethical business activities, Korea was ranked as 21^st from the bottom of the list among 194 countries surveyed in 2021 and 18^th from the bottom in 2022. Among the Asian countries, Korea ranked the third after Japan and Taiwan. With the enactment of the ACRC Act and Graft Act, government organizations, companies, and other organizations in Korea are striving harder to establish internal policies and procedures to strengthen compliance programs and advance the Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) framework.

Given the nature of bribery or corruption, it is difficult to obtain objective evidence and the investigation agencies often have no choice but to rely on the statements of a person that is directly responsible for the act or a person who was deeply involved in the act. Korean regulators are making efforts to clearly present the standards for the conduct subject to regulation in this regard and strengthen the reporting system for violations of these standards. Further, the regulators are encouraging reporting by taking measures to protect the reporting person.

In addition, with respect to the duty of public officials to file report of crimes in relation to their duties, Article 234(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act requires a public official to file a complaint in the course of performing his/her duties if he/she found that a crime is committed by another in performing his/her duties. Article 56 of the ACRC Act also states that “where a public official learns an act of corruption committed by another public official in performing his/her duties or is forced or proposed by another pubic official to commit an act of corruption, he/she shall without delay report such fact to any investigative authority, the Board of Audit and Inspection, or the [ACRC] Commission.”

As a relevant administrative rule, the Guidelines for Filing a Complaint for Public Officials’ Crimes in Executing Their Duties  (Prime Minister’s Directive No. 696), sets out the guidelines for the person filing the complaint, the subject of the complaint, and the procedure for filing the complaint, and stipulates that the head of central administrative agencies, the relevant government agencies, and other agencies at various levels, such as the local government, must enact and enforce detailed guidelines appropriate to the circumstances of the agency, and in particular, more strictly deal with bribery crimes.

As discussed in our response to Question 27, the investigation method based on forensic technology is being actively utilized. Given the challenge of tracing virtual assets involved in money laundering, for example, the significance of utilizing forensic investigation techniques is on the rise.

Due to the lack of legal or compliance organizations’ authority to conduct internal investigations, and lack of attorney-client privilege recognized under Korean law, there have been some issues with seeking cooperation from the department involved in the bribery and corruption issue at hand. Since the establishment of the compliance system is not sufficiently advanced in South Korea, there is a tendency to focus on handling incidents that have already occurred rather than carrying out systematic management and investigation.

As the amount of electronic data increases, investigative agencies are making efforts to implement forensic review systems and to train and maintain relevant professionals. An increasing number of vendors are providing forensic services for internal investigations of private companies. As the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act on evidence were enacted in the context of collecting hard copy evidences (i.e., non-electronic data), there is considerable uncertainty surrounding whether parties have complied with the correct procedure under the Criminal Procedure Act when securing electronic evidence. In particular, there have been cases in which the court had specifically ruled that comprehensive seizure of electronic information without the relevance to the case should be restricted.

There is social pressure on companies to implement a more advanced compliance systems that can function effectively to combat sophisticated bribery and corruption activities. In addition, Korean companies doing being overseas are faced with the task of establishing policies and procedures to meet various compliance standards related to global anti-corruption efforts, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the United States, the Bribery Act of the United Kingdom, and the World Bank’s suspension and debarment system.

In South Korea, there is no practice of entering into settlements in connection with bribery and corruption offenses. Considering that bribery and corruption is often discovered in reliance upon the statements of the direct party or the relevant persons, it would be helpful to adopt a system of entering into settlements (akin to a plea bargain in common law countries) with parties that provide material information about bribery or corruption. Indeed, the necessity of adopting the settlement framework has been in discussions in Korean legal society.