India

The validity of an arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) ultimately boils down to consent. At its core, an arbitration clause is nothing more than a contractual promise by the parties to resolve their disputes outside the regular court system. But consent isn’t always straightforward. Sometimes parties sign a contract containing a clause that is too weak or tentative to create any real obligation to arbitrate. In other situations, a party may perform extensively under a contract it never signed, leaving the question open whether it is bound by the arbitration clause contained in it. These are two quite different problems, and both come up fairly often in practice.   The Hon’ble Supreme Court has addressed these two pertinent issues in two distinct judgments which together mark the outer scope of what Section 7 of the Act requires. In Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2026 INSC 384) (Nagreeka), the Court held that a clause providing that disputes “can” be settled by arbitration does not create a binding arbitration agreement. On the other hand, in Glencore International AG v. Shree Ganesh Metals and Another (2025 INSC 1036) (Glencore), the Court ruled that an unsigned but clearly mandatory arbitration clause is enforceable if the non-signing party’s conduct shows unequivocal acceptance of the contract. When these two decisions are read together, a clear principle on the scope of Section 7 is established that conduct can fill the gap left by an unsigned agreement, but it cannot fix a clause that, by its own wording, does not create a binding obligation on the parties. I. WHEN THE CLAUSE ITSELF IS NOT ENOUGH: NAGREEKA While Section 7 of the Act requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing, it does not specify what language is sufficient to create one. That question has been settled by a consistent line of decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court had earlier identified the essential attributes of a valid arbitration agreement in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi (1998) 3 SCC 573), which required, inter alia, that the agreement contemplate a binding decision by the tribunal deriving from the consent of the parties, and that the agreement to refer disputes to the tribunal be intended to be enforceable in law. More recently, the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander ((2007) 5 SCC 719) (Jagdish Chander), has authoritatively held that the words of an arbitration clause must disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration, not merely the possibility of doing so. A clause that provides that parties "can, if they so desire" refer disputes to arbitration is not an arbitration agreement; it is an agreement to consider entering into one, contingent on fresh consent when a dispute actually arises. It has also made clear that mere use of the word "arbitration" or "arbitrator" will not make a clause a valid arbitration agreement if it requires or contemplates fresh consent at the time of a dispute. The decision in Nagreeka is a direct application of this principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander. The dispute arose from a bill of lading wherein the Clause 25 provided that differences between the parties "can be settled by arbitration in India or a place mutually agreed with each party appointing an arbitrator." Subsequent thereto, when a payment dispute arose, the appellant invoked this clause and sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act. when a dispute with respect to payments arose and the appellant sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act. The respondent, however, refused to participate in arbitration, contending that the clause imposed no binding obligation to do so. Both the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court agreed. The Bombay High Court dismissed the Section 11 application, and the Supreme Court upheld that dismissal. The Court's reasoning was based on a careful reading of the word "can". Examining its ordinary dictionary meaning across multiple sources, the Court held that "can" denotes capacity or factual possibility, not obligation. It contrasted the word "can" with "shall," which signals a mandate, and noted that even "may" carries a stronger obligatory weight in judicial interpretation than "can" does. The Court then applied this understanding to Clause 25 and held that the clause indicated merely the future possibility of referring disputes to arbitration. For disputes to actually be settled by arbitration, a further agreement between the parties would be required, and such an agreement could only come into existence if both parties consented to it. Since the respondent had refused to refer the matter to arbitration, no such further agreement existed. The Court also dealt with several arguments advanced by the Appellants. The first argument was that the heading of the clause read "Arbitration," which the Appellant argued demonstrated the parties' intention. The Court rejected this, holding that a heading cannot supply a mandatory obligation that the body of the clause does not contain. The second argument was that the Section 11 stage requires only a prima facie examination of whether an arbitration agreement exists, and that doubts should be resolved in favour of referral. The Court clearly dealt with this argument by placing reliance on SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg. ((2024) 12 SCC 1), it acknowledged this limitation but held that it did not assist the appellant, because the absence of a binding arbitration clause was "manifestly and ex facie certain" on the face of Clause 25 itself. The prima facie threshold does not require courts to refer parties to arbitration where the non-existence of the arbitration agreement is plain on the document. This reading aligns with the caution expressed in Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P) Ltd. ((2025) 2 SCC 192), that the limited jurisdiction of referral courts must not be misused to compel participation in arbitration on the basis of non-existent agreements. The significance of Nagreeka: Nagreeka adds to the existing line of judgments in two respects. First, it extends the mandatory obligation analysis to the word "can," in the arbitration context. The Court's close textual analysis of ordinary dictionary usage and its comparison with "shall" and "may" provides a useful linguistic framework for evaluating dispute resolution clauses going forward. Second, the decision confirms that no combination of contextual factors will cure a fundamentally permissive clause. The presence of the word "Arbitration" as a heading, the commercial context of the transaction, and the general judicial preference for referring commercial disputes to arbitration were all considered and all found insufficient. The clause itself is dispositive. What makes Nagreeka useful for practitioners is its specificity. A clause using "can" or "may" will ordinarily be treated as permissive and, absent a clear contextual correction, will not constitute a valid arbitration agreement. II. WHEN THE SIGNATURE IS MISSING BUT THE CONSENT IS NOT: GLENCORE The second problem is structurally the inverse of the first. Where Nagreeka concerned a clause whose language was deficient, Glencore concerned a clause whose language was unambiguously mandatory but which had not been signed by one of the parties. The question was whether extensive performance under the contract could supply the missing assent. Section 7(3) of the Act requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing. It does not specifically require a signature. Moreover, Section 7(4)(b) of the Act expressly provides that an exchange of communications providing a record of the agreement is sufficient. This much has been settled since Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas v. Goolbai Hormusji (AIR 1955 SC 812), which established that formal execution is not a prerequisite for a valid arbitration agreement. The essential ingredients of a valid arbitration agreement as identified in Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. ((2003) 7 SCC 418) include, relevantly, that the parties must intend to settle their disputes by a private tribunal and must agree in writing to be bound by its decision. The requirement of intention and agreement in writing does not, however, require that the writing take the specific form of a document signed by all parties. Section 7(4)(b) expressly recognises that an exchange of communications establishing a record of the agreement is sufficient. The principle was further developed in Great Offshore Ltd. v. Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Co. ((2008) 14 SCC 240), where the Court held that procedural formalities such as signatures, stamps, seals are red tape and not conclusive if the parties can demonstrate their intention to arbitrate through other justiciable means. Glencore applies this framework in a factual scenario where the conduct evidence was exceptionally strong. The Respondent, Shree Ganesh Metals had never signed the contract containing the arbitration clause, which designated London as the seat. However, it accepted delivery of zinc metal against invoices that each specifically referenced the contract by its unique number. It instructed its bank to issue standby letters of credit that also expressly referenced the same contract. And it sent a direct written communication to Glencore confirming that it would not default in performance under the contract. The Bombay High Court nonetheless refused to refer the parties to arbitration, holding that no concluded contract existed in the absence of a signature. The Supreme Court reversed the concurrent findings of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, holding that the court had failed to give proper weightage to the conduct evidence. It held that Shree Ganesh's consistent engagement with the specific contract document demonstrated unequivocal acceptance of its terms, including the arbitration clause. The Court confirmed that signatures are not required under Sections 7(4)(b), 7(4)(c), or 7(5) of the Act, and directed referral to arbitration under Section 45. It is to be considered that the conduct evidence in Glencore was notable for being referential rather than merely consistent. Shree Ganesh did not simply perform obligations that the contract, it did so against documentation that specifically referred the underlying contract by its reference number across multiple independent transactions. This is a pertinent and a material distinction. Conduct that is merely consistent with a contract (for example, accepting delivery of goods without specifically acknowledging the underlying contract document) raises a different evidentiary question from conduct that specifically references the contract and thereby demonstrates that the non-signing party has engaged with its terms. The strength of Glencore as a precedent lies precisely in this specificity, and courts applying the conduct-based framework in future cases will need to attend to the quality of the conduct evidence, not merely its existence. The Significance of Glencore: Glencore clearly settles two pertinent questions that frequently arise. First, it confirms that a non-signing party which has specifically engaged with a contract document across multiple independent transactions cannot resist arbitration on the basis of non-signature alone. The Court's emphasis on referential conduct draws a workable evidentiary line, one where documentation that identifies the contract by name or number carries greater probative weight than performance that is merely consistent with the contract's existence. Second, the decision reinforces that the conduct-based inquiry under Section 7(4)(b) is not a low threshold. A party seeking to establish an arbitration agreement through conduct must demonstrate that the other party engaged with the specific contract, not merely that it behaved in a manner the contract contemplated. For practitioners, the practical lesson cuts in both directions. A party relying on an unsigned contract should ensure that all downstream documentation, including invoices, letters of credit, and written communications, specifically references the contract by its identifier. Conversely, a party that has performed under a contract it did not intend to be bound by must raise that objection early and clearly, since consistent performance against specific contractual references will be treated as unequivocal acceptance of all the contract's terms, including its arbitration clause. III. THE COMMON PRINCIPLE BETWEEN NAGREEKA AND GLENCORE: Nagreeka and Glencore address different facets of failures of consent, but the principle underlying both decisions is the same. An arbitration agreement requires genuine consent to arbitrate, and courts will look to the substance of the parties' relationship rather than the form of their documentation to determine whether that consent exists. In the mandatory obligation line, the inquiry is whether the parties' chosen language reflects a present agreement to be bound by arbitration, or merely a tentative arrangement to consider it. Where the clause is permissive, no amount of subsequent conduct can transform it into a binding agreement. The parties have, by their own words, reserved the right to choose arbitration afresh when a dispute arises. That reservation cannot be overridden by a court. In the conduct and communications line, the inquiry is whether the parties' dealings, taken as a whole, reflect a genuine agreement to arbitrate. Where the arbitration clause is itself mandatory, the absence of a signature is a problem of form rather than substance, and conduct that clearly demonstrates acceptance of the clause will cure it, particularly where that conduct specifically references the contract rather than merely being consistent with its existence. The order in which courts approach these questions also matters. A court must first satisfy itself that the clause in question actually imposes an obligation to arbitrate. If it does not, the question of whether a party is bound through conduct simply does not arise. Nagreeka confirms that this threshold inquiry remains available even at the Section 11 stage. A clause that is plainly permissive on its face can be identified and rejected at that stage itself, without sending the parties through the time and expense of constituting an arbitral tribunal. IV. CONCLUSION: Section 7 of the Act ultimately turns on whether the parties genuinely agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration. The form of that agreement is quite flexible. It can take the shape of a signed document, an exchange of communications, or clear conduct showing acceptance of a mandatory arbitration clause. What it cannot be is a permissive clause that merely leaves the option of arbitration open for a future decision, or conduct that tries to create an obligation which the parties’ own wording did not establish. When read together, Nagreeka and Glencore mark the two ends of the spectrum. For practitioners, the practical takeaway is clear. The strength of any dispute resolution clause depends on the obligation it actually creates. A clause using “can” or “may” does not amount to a binding arbitration agreement. It is only an invitation that either party can decline. By contrast, when the clause uses clear mandatory language such as “shall”, a party who has performed under the contract cannot easily escape arbitration merely by pointing to the absence of its signature. In the end, there are no shortcuts. Careful drafting that leaves no room for ambiguity, along with proper documentation of performance and acceptance, remains the safest safeguard on both sides. AUTHORED BY – PRAGALBH BHARDWAJ, ASSOCIATE PARTNER, KING STUBB AND KASIVA https://ksandk.com/people/pragalbh-bhardwaj/  

Neeti Wilson and Kartik Madankar Introduction Agriculture remains the backbone of the Indian economy, providing livelihoods to a significant portion of the population and contributing substantially to national economic growth. Plant varieties play a crucial role in ensuring food security, supplying fodder, and supporting numerous agricultural and industrial activities. Advancements in agricultural science have enabled breeders to develop new plant varieties possessing desirable traits such as higher yields, resistance to pests and diseases, improved nutritional content, enhanced adaptability to climatic conditions, and attractive ornamental characteristics. These innovations are the result of years of research, innovation, and substantial investment by the seed industry. Given the significant resources involved in developing new plant varieties, an effective intellectual property protection framework is essential to encourage continued investment and innovation. Article 27.3(b) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) permits member countries to protect plant varieties either through patents, an effective sui generis system, or a combination of both. India chose to adopt a sui generis system suited to its socio-economic and agricultural conditions by enacting the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 (PPV&FR Act). International Recognition of Provisional Protection The concept of provisional protection is well recognized in international plant variety protection systems. Article 13 of the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention) requires member states to provide breeders with provisional protection during the period between the publication of an application and the grant of a breeder's right. Although member states retain flexibility in determining the nature and scope of such protection, the Convention mandates that breeders should, at a minimum, be entitled to equitable remuneration from persons who perform acts requiring the breeder's authorization after rights are granted. The UPOV approach reflects an acknowledgment that the period between filing and grant constitutes a vulnerable phase in the life cycle of plant variety protection. Without provisional protection, third parties may commercially exploit a variety before registration is completed, thereby diminishing the value of the breeder's eventual rights. While India has consciously adopted a sui generis framework distinct from the UPOV system, Article 13 offers a useful benchmark for understanding the policy rationale underlying provisional protection and highlights the importance of safeguarding breeders' interests during the pendency of registration proceedings. The PPV&FR Act seeks to balance the interests of plant breeders and farmers by protecting breeders' rights while recognizing the traditional role of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic resources. Upon registration, a breeder is granted exclusive rights over a registered variety for a period of fifteen years in the case of most crops and eighteen years in the case of trees and vines. However, an important question arises: what protection is available to a breeder during the period between the filing of a registration application and the grant of registration? This issue assumes significance because the registration process under the PPV&FR Act is often lengthy, involving technical examination and DUS (Distinctiveness, Uniformity and Stability) testing over multiple crop seasons and locations. During this intervening period, breeders may be vulnerable to unauthorized exploitation of their varieties. It is in this context that the concept of provisional protection assumes importance. Statutory Basis of Provisional Protection under Section 24(5) Section 24(5) of the PPV&FR Act provides a form of provisional protection to plant breeders. The provision empowers the Registrar to issue appropriate directions to safeguard the breeder's interests against any abusive acts committed by third parties during the period between the filing of an application and the grant of registration. However, the Act neither defines what constitutes an "abusive act" nor specifies the nature of directions that may be issued by the Registrar. This legislative ambiguity creates uncertainty regarding the scope and effectiveness of protection available to breeders during the pendency of registration proceedings. Comparison with Provisional Rights under Patent Law A comparison with the Patents Act, 1970 illustrates the lack of clarity under the PPV&FR Act. Section 11A(7) of the Patents Act provides that from the date of publication of a patent application until the grant of a patent, the applicant enjoys rights similar to those of a patentee, although infringement proceedings can be instituted only after the patent is granted. Upon grant, the patentee may seek damages for unauthorized use occurring from the date of publication of the application. The patent regime therefore establishes a clear framework regarding the rights available during the pre-grant period and the remedies that may subsequently be claimed. By contrast, Section 24(5) of the PPV&FR Act leaves unanswered several important questions concerning the nature of protected interests, the conduct that constitutes an abusive act, and the remedies available to an aggrieved breeder. The comparison highlights the need for greater legislative clarity regarding provisional protection under the PPV&FR Act. Growing Relevance of Section 24(5) Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in plant variety registrations, with 2,017 certificates issued in 2024 and 2,073 certificates issued in 2025. This trend is expected to continue as awareness regarding plant breeders' rights grows among seed companies and agricultural innovators. At the same time, the registration process remains inherently time-consuming. Before a certificate of registration can be granted, the applicant's variety must undergo rigorous DUS testing conducted by the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Authority over multiple crop seasons and locations. Only after the Authority is satisfied that the variety fulfils the statutory requirements, the registration is granted. The delay inherent in this process creates a period during which breeders may face unauthorized use, commercialization, or misappropriation of their varieties. The increasing number of petitions filed under Section 24(5) reflects the practical significance of this concern. It is understood that several such petitions are presently pending before the Authority, and their number is likely to increase as the plant variety protection regime continues to mature. Defining "Abusive Acts": The Need for a Principled Interpretation A significant weakness of Section 24(5) is the absence of a statutory definition of the expression "abusive acts." The Act neither explains the circumstances in which a breeder's interests may be considered threatened nor identifies the categories of conduct that justify the exercise of the Registrar's powers. Consequently, the provision leaves considerable room for uncertainty in its application. A purposive interpretation of Section 24(5), however, suggests that an abusive act should encompass any unauthorized commercial or regulatory conduct that has the potential to prejudice the breeder's proprietary interests in a variety pending registration. The rationale underlying provisional protection is to preserve the commercial value of the breeder's innovation during the period in which the registration application is under examination. Therefore, acts that undermine the breeder's ability to exclusively exploit the variety after registration should ordinarily fall within the scope of Section 24(5). Viewed from this perspective, abusive acts may include the commercial production, sale, export, or import of a variety that is the subject matter of a pending application. Similarly, the adoption of an identical or deceptively similar denomination for a competing variety may mislead the market and dilute the distinct identity of the applicant's variety. Unauthorized use of a pending variety for the development of an Essentially Derived Variety (EDV) may also amount to an abusive act, particularly where such use enables a third party to appropriate the breeder's innovation before registration is granted. In addition, conduct by licensees or agents that exceeds or violates the scope of authority granted by the breeder may warrant protection under Section 24(5). Likewise, the submission of false or misleading information concerning a pending variety, whether before the Authority or in the marketplace, may adversely affect the breeder's commercial interests and undermine the integrity of the registration process. Although these examples are not exhaustive, they illustrate that the concept of abusive acts should be interpreted in a manner that furthers the legislative objective of protecting breeders against commercial misappropriation during the pendency of registration proceedings. Nature of Reliefs Available under Section 24(5) Although Section 24(5) authorizes the Registrar to issue directions for protecting breeders' interests, it does not specify the nature of such directions. Nevertheless, guidance may be derived from other provisions of the PPV&FR Act. Section 11 of the Act confers upon the Authority and the Registrar powers analogous to those of a civil court. These powers include receiving evidence, administering oaths, summoning witnesses, compelling the production of documents, and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. The Authority and Registrar may also award costs, which are enforceable in the same manner as a decree of a civil court. Further guidance may be derived from Section 66 of the Act, which prescribes the remedies available in infringement proceedings. Section 66 empowers courts to grant injunctions and, at the option of the breeder, damages or an account of profits. The provision also contemplates ex parte injunctions and interim measures such as preservation of evidence, discovery of documents, and attachment of property to secure damages or costs. Although Section 66 applies specifically to infringement proceedings involving registered varieties, the principles underlying these remedies may assist in shaping the contours of relief under Section 24(5). A purposive interpretation of the provision would suggest that the Registrar's powers should be sufficiently broad to prevent irreversible harm to a breeder's interests during the pendency of a registration application. Judicial Interpretation of Section 24(5) The constitutional validity of Section 24(5) has been the subject of considerable judicial scrutiny. In Prabhat Agri Biotech Ltd. v. Registrar of Plant Varieties & Ors., the Delhi High Court declared Section 24(5) unconstitutional, holding that it conferred unguided and excessively broad powers upon the Registrar in relation to vaguely defined "abusive acts." According to the Court, the absence of statutory safeguards created a risk of arbitrary exercise of power and rendered the provision vulnerable under Article 14 of the Constitution. However, the operation of this judgment was subsequently stayed by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Overseas Corporation v. Kaveri Seed Company Limited. Consequently, Section 24(5) continues to remain operative pending final adjudication by the Supreme Court. The legal position was revisited in UPL Limited v. Registrar & Anr. (2024), where the Delhi High Court examined the effect of the Supreme Court's stay order. The Court held that Section 24(5) remains fully operative until the Supreme Court finally decides the matter. It further observed that the Registrar's refusal to entertain a Section 24(5) application on the ground that protection was available only after registration was contrary to the express language of the statute. The Court emphasized that the stay of a judgment declaring a statutory provision unconstitutional does not render the provision inoperative. Accordingly, the Registrar's order was set aside and the application was restored for consideration on its merits. The decision in UPL Limited is significant because it reaffirms the continuing availability of provisional protection under the PPV&FR Act and underscores the legislative intent behind Section 24(5), namely, the protection of breeders during the pendency of registration proceedings. Conclusion and Recommendations Section 24(5) occupies a unique position within the PPV&FR Act. It represents the legislature's recognition that breeders require protection not only after registration but also during the often lengthy period in which their applications remain pending before the Authority. However, the provision suffers from two significant deficiencies: first, the absence of a statutory definition of "abusive acts"; and secondly, the lack of clarity regarding the nature and scope of relief that may be granted by the Registrar. The judicial developments in Prabhat Agri Biotech, Pioneer Overseas, and UPL Limited demonstrate both the importance of Section 24(5) and the difficulties arising from its present drafting. While the provision continues to operate, uncertainty regarding its scope remains a source of litigation and administrative inconsistency. Given the increasing number of plant variety registrations and the growing commercial significance of proprietary seed technologies, there is a compelling case for legislative or regulatory intervention. The PPV&FR Authority may consider issuing detailed guidelines identifying the categories of conduct that constitute abusive acts and clarifying the range of interim and final reliefs available under Section 24(5). Alternatively, the provision may be amended to expressly define the scope of provisional protection and the powers of the Registrar. Such reforms would enhance legal certainty, reduce litigation, strengthen confidence in India's plant variety protection regime, and further the broader objectives of encouraging innovation, investment, and agricultural development. A clearer and more predictable framework for provisional protection would ultimately reinforce the effectiveness of India's sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties and contribute to the long-term growth of the agricultural sector. ---------------------------------------- Cases Referred: Prabhat Agri Biotech Ltd v Registrar of Plant Varieties & Ors, WP(C) No 250/2009 (Delhi High Court, 2 December 2016). Pioneer Overseas Corporation v Kaveri Seed Company Ltd, SLP (C) No 19195/2017 (Supreme Court of India, 31 July 2017). UPL Ltd v Registrar & Ors, CA (COMM IPD-PV) 3/2022 (Delhi High Court, 22 February 2024).

NAINAAZ IRANI Nainaaz is a 2014 graduate from Mumbai University, with a Master of Business Laws degree from National Law School of India University, Bangalore. Nainaaz has been with the firm for over 8 years and has over 11 years of experience in real estate. Nainaaz advises domestic and international clients on complex real estate transactions across India. In addition to conventional real estate matters, including title due diligence and transaction documentation, her practice encompasses private equity investments in commercial real estate, where she assists clients on structuring, documentation and execution. Her expertise also extends to the area of private client practice.   ROHINI JAISWAL Rohini is a 2015 graduate from the University of Nagpur, with an LLM in International Commercial Arbitration and Dispute Resolution from National University of Singapore. Rohini has been with the firm for over 7 years. She has more than 10 years of experience in civil and commercial litigation with particular focus on commercial contracts, white-collar crime, and labor, and she advises and represents clients in both institutional and ad hoc international and domestic arbitrations. She has also advised and acted for clients in disputes arising from matters relating to town planning and environmental laws, regulatory actions and disciplinary proceedings for professional misconduct, constitutional and public interest litigations, company law, insolvency and bankruptcy, testamentary proceedings, and intellectual property.

Anand and Anand secures favourable order protecting rights in BRIDGESTONE, a recognised well-known trademark. New Delhi, May 21, 2026: Anand and Anand has secured a significant victory for Bridgestone Corporation before the Trade Marks Registry, Delhi, which has refused registration of the mark ‘TRI BIGSTONEPUNCTURE’ (label) in Class 12 after finding it deceptively similar to the globally recognised BRIDGESTONE trademark. In a detailed order, the Registrar of Trade Marks upheld Bridgestone’s opposition and concluded that the impugned mark was likely to cause confusion among consumers. The Registry observed that the dominant element “BIGSTONE” appeared to have been derived from BRIDGESTONE by merely dropping certain letters and held that the additional elements in the applicant’s mark were insufficient to distinguish it from Bridgestone’s well-known mark. The Registry further found that the competing marks were visually, structurally and phonetically similar, and reiterated the settled principle that where the essential feature of a prior trademark has been adopted, the presence of additional matter does not dispel the likelihood of confusion. Importantly, the Registrar rejected the applicant’s defence of honest adoption and held that there was no satisfactory explanation for the adoption of the impugned mark. The order records that the adoption appeared unfair and mala fide, reinforcing the protection available to established and reputed brands against attempts to appropriate their goodwill. The applicant’s claim of use was also rejected, with the Registry holding that the evidence on record was insufficient to establish the claimed user. In addition, the applicant’s argument that its goods were distinct from those of Bridgestone was not accepted. The Registry held that the goods shared a common consumer base and were likely to create confusion in the marketplace. The order also recognises Bridgestone’s extensive reputation and prior rights in the BRIDGESTONE mark, noting its inclusion in the Registrar’s list of well-known trademarks. The decision underscores the increasing willingness of Indian trademark authorities to scrutinise attempts to adopt marks that closely mimic reputed brands and serves as a reminder that minor textual variations will not insulate an applicant from findings of deceptive similarity where the overall commercial impression remains closely associated with a prior mark. Safir Anand, Head of Trademarks, Commercial and Corporate IP at Anand and Anand, said: “This decision is a strong reaffirmation of the principle that goodwill built over decades cannot be appropriated through cosmetic alterations or clever misspellings. The Registry has rightly recognised that consumer perception remains central to trademark protection and that well-known marks must receive meaningful protection against attempts to ride on their reputation.” The matter was handled by Safir Anand along with Twinky Rampal and Vaishali Sharma from Anand and Anand. About Anand and Anand Anand and Anand is one of India’s leading intellectual property law firms with offices in Delhi NCR, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and Bengaluru. The firm advises and represents clients across patents, trademarks, copyrights, designs, litigation, enforcement and allied areas of intellectual property law as also corporate and commercial laws. For over a century, Anand and Anand has been at the forefront of protecting innovation, brands and creative assets for domestic and international clients.