Supreme Court Rules High Court Erred in Re-engaging School Principal in a Manner that Meant He was Effectively Reinstated...

The Supreme Court has recently found that the High Court, Labour Court and the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) erred in law in ordering the re-engagement of a principal of a primary school. In An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court and Aodhagán Ó Súird and the Department of Education [2024] IESC 38, the Supreme Court (judgment delivered by O’Donnell C.J.) emphasised the exceptional nature of the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement and the need to ensure that they are appropriate in the particular circumstances of a case.

Facts: This is a long-running dispute which has lasted over 13 years. In January 2012, the Principal of Gaelscoil Moshíológ (the “School”)was placed on administrative leave following an incident in a classroom. He was subsequently suspended on full pay in May 2013 following the discovery of issues relating to enrolment figures and pending the outcome of a disciplinary process. After a protracted disciplinary process, the Principal was dismissed from his role with effect from 30th November 2015. He appealed his dismissal, but his appeal was unsuccessful.

The Principal brought a claim to the WRC which found that he had been unfairly dismissed and ordered his re-engagement with effect from 1st January 2018. The Board of Management of the School (the “Board”) appealed this decision to the Labour Court which found that the Principal had been unfairly dismissed and ordered his re-engagement with effect from 1st September 2017, four months earlier than the date stipulated by the WRC. The Board subsequently appealed to the High Court on a point of law.The High Court dismissed the appeal, but found that the Labour Court erred in directing re-engagement from September 2017. The High Court initially ordered reinstatement with effect from 30th January 2013, which was the date on which it considered that the period of administrative leave should have ended. However, in a subsequent judgment re-engagement was ordered with effect from 30th November 2015, restored to payroll with effect from 1st August 2023, and restored to his duties with effect from 4th August 2023, and paid arrears of salary with effect from 30th November 2015. The High Court also ordered the Board of Management to pay the Principal’s legal costs on a legal practitioner and client basis, a higher legal costs liability than usual.The Board appealed again to the Supreme Court.

Decision: The Supreme Court examined the scope of an appeal on a point of law, which, it is well established, does not involve a re-hearing of the case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court went much further than holding that the Labour Court did not err in law, but exceeded its scope of appeal by considering the merits of the case.

O’Donnell C.J. went on to say that the decision-making bodies were incorrect in law in ordering the remedy of re-engagement, emphasising that reinstatement and re-engagement are remedies that are “exceptional in nature”. That was not given due consideration by the WRC, Labour Court, or the High Court. The Court stated that the decisions to re-engage the Principal “focussed solely on the interests of the Principal” and failed to consider other factors that the Supreme Court deemed ought to have been considered, including:

O’Donnell C.J. also placed emphasis on the fact that a new principal had been appointed to the school for some time:

“It is necessary to consider whether any order of reinstatement or reengagement is practicable in the circumstances. If it is not practicable it should not be ordered. This assessment may include a consideration of whether that reengagement will displace an innocent person who has been engaged to fulfil that role.”

He went on to say that:

“Indeed, neither body made any finding about the validity of the appointment of the principal. (It is indeed a valid criticism of both decisions that they did not consider the impact of their decision on the position of the new principal at all).”

In considering the circumstance as a whole, O’Donnell C.J. stated that ordering re-engagement in this case “does not reflect the exceptional nature of the remedy.”

He differentiated between the Board of Management of a school, and the management of a commercial enterprise, as a school Board of Management is run by volunteers, has less flexibility, and cannot negotiate settlements in a manner open to commercial bodies. It would not be reasonable to expect the school to remain without a principal during lengthy litigation proceedings. In light of this, the Court went on to say:

“Life must go on. In this case this was a working school, and the pupils, parents and teachers could all reasonably expect to have a principal in place. As set out in the extract from Redmond on Dismissal Law (op. cit.) at paragraph 103 above, it is extremely rare, even in those cases in which a claim for unfair dismissal succeeds, for an order for reinstatement to be made. It is not reasonable to expect that businesses would remain in limbo pending the outcome of protracted legal proceedings. That is so in general, but must apply with particular force in a case such as this, in which there has been such a lapse of time between dismissal and adjudication, and in the context of a small national school.”

The Chief Justice noted that the appropriate order to make would usually be to set aside the Labour Court’s decision which was upheld by the High Court and remit it back to be reconsidered. However, in light of the "inordinate amount of time that has already elapsed", the Supreme Court found that it would not be appropriate to do so, particularly in circumstances where the Principal had been back in his position for close to a year.

The Supreme Court ordered that the portion of the decision of the High Court varying the order of the Labour Court (by providing for re-engagement to date from the date of effective dismissal of 30th November 2015) should be set aside and the order of the Labour Court deeming re-engagement to have taken effect from September 2017 should be restored.

Finally, the Supreme Court varied the order of the High Court Order in relation to costs. The High Court had ordered that the Board of Management should pay the Principal’s legal costs on a legal practitioner and client basis. The Supreme Court disagreed with this order. O’Donnell C.J. found that costs ought to have been awarded on a party and party basis. The Court also ordered the Principal to pay back the Board of Management the arrears of almost two years of salary that was awarded to him by the High Court.

Takeaway for Employers: This case is an important authority from the Supreme Court addressing the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement under the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear to lower decision-making bodies that those remedies are only to be ordered in exceptional cases. Factors to be considered in cases seeking these remedies include the passage of time, the state of relations between the parties, changes in the workplace, and the implications on innocent third parties.

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Authors - Jane Holian, Jenny Wakely